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ABSTRACT 
Recent domestic emergencies such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
and the destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 proved to many 
Americans that disaster preparedness, response and recovery are vital to America’s 
national security. These tragic events raised doubts about the federal government’s 
preparedness and competence to rapidly respond to crises, and increased political and 
public pressure to improve federal response capabilities, including the possibility of 
widening the U.S. military’s role in homeland security and disaster response.  However, 
before widening its role, the U.S. military must take on the initiative to evaluate and 
improve upon the military’s current roles and mechanisms for providing effective and 
timely domestic incident management.  Closer evaluation of the existing provisions and 
procedures for providing domestic military assistance is critical to this initiative and is 
desperately needed.   
This thesis examines one of the DoD’s current provisions for providing 
immediate disaster response and assistance—the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority 
(IRA).  This thesis evaluates the IRA provision’s role and capability to provide disaster 
assistance when first responders are wiped out or otherwise incapable of providing 
effective initial disaster response.  Most would agree a “smarter” DoD role is more 
valuable than a larger one.  This thesis explores various means to make the IRA provision 
“smarter” to help maximize resources and improve immediate military disaster response 
and assistance.  This thesis also strives to determine where the DoD’s IRA provision fits 
in relation to other federal and military response mechanisms and established national 
strategy and policy.  The research identifies current barriers to the IRA provision’s 
effectiveness, such as strategic guidance, oversight, and training, and also provides 
recommendations to help eliminate these barriers to eventually improve the overall 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. 
history.  However, there is no question that the Nation’s current incident 
management plans and procedures fell short of what was needed and that 
improved operational plans could have better mitigated the Hurricane’s 
tragic events.         
            -- Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned1 
Is America prepared for disaster?  Recent domestic emergencies such as the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 significantly raised American concerns over the federal government’s 
preparedness and/or competence to rapidly respond to crises.  These heightened concerns 
increased both political and public pressure to improve federal response capabilities, to 
include potentially widening the U.S. military’s role in homeland security and disaster 
response.  Many now agree a closer evaluation of the existing procedures for providing 
domestic military assistance, including the Department of Defense’s (DoD) role when 
first responders are wiped out or otherwise incapable of providing initial response, is 
desperately needed.2  The traditional assumption that the DoD will be a resource of last 
resort during domestic crisis may require re-examination or clarification.  However, it is 
more prudent to have a “smarter” DoD role than a larger one.3  Therefore, it is important 
to determine how the U.S. military can improve its current preparedness and response 
mechanisms to domestic emergencies before exploring expanded roles and missions.   
The DoD currently provides resources to mitigate the effects of domestic 
disasters, both natural and man-made, through one of its primary homeland security 
missions—Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).4  The DoD has often been 
                                                 
1 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, (Washington D.C, 
The White House, February 2006), 19.  
2 House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, (Washington D.C, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 15 February 2006), 15. 
3 Discussion of a “smarter” versus “larger” DoD role in domestic incidents was raised by the Select 
Bipartisan Committee investigating the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.  See: House of 
Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, 15. 
4 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, (Washington, D.C., Office of 
Homeland Security, The White House, July 2002), 13. 
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called upon to provide vital DSCA assistance to local, state, and federal first responders.  
Historical events of military aid and assistance include the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, and more recently following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  The long-
standing reliance of civilian agencies upon DoD resources and personnel is well-founded 
in a review of historic domestic disasters and until greater civilian capabilities are 
developed to respond to domestic disasters, the expectation that the DoD will provide 
substantial, if not massive, assistance will continue.5   
To facilitate DSCA, the DoD has developed and provided various forms of 
guidance, organizational constructs, and provisions for domestic operations.  However, 
the failures associated with the response to Hurricane Katrina have raised new concerns 
over the U.S. military’s preparedness to effectively mitigate the effects of disasters 
through DSCA planning and response.  The Department of Defense (DoD) has been 
urged to expand domestic planning with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
delineate when the U.S. military may lead the federal response and to work together with 
state officials to improve the integration of military response capabilities.6  The DoD has 
also been encouraged to revise its primary provision for providing immediate DSCA - 
Immediate Response Authority or IRA.  The White House report on the lessons learned 
during Hurricane Katrina argues that military commanders “in appropriate 
circumstances” ought not necessarily need to receive requests from local authorities 
before proceeding with their response, so that they might provide a more flexible and 
rapid military response to disasters.7   
While the role and capabilities of the U.S. military in traditional combat 
operations is fairly well defined, the U.S. military’s direct and immediate civil support 
role and missions authorized under the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority (IRA) 
provision has not been thoroughly assessed or recently evaluated.  Since the U.S. 
                                                 
5 For further discussion related to the continued reliance upon the DoD for massive assistance see:  
Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, Hurricane Katrina: DoD Disaster Response, 
(Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 19 September 2005) and “Military May Do More 
Domestic Disaster Work,” Washington Post, 19 September 2005. 
6 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 94. 
7 Ibid. 
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military’s current role in homeland security and disaster preparedness is significantly 
guided and impacted by the federal government’s strategic objectives, guidance, and 
policies, this thesis first reviews and evaluates the federal government’s overall role in 
domestic emergencies in Chapter 2.  Building on this foundation, Chapter 3 reviews the 
U.S. military’s role, responsibilities, and guidance for domestic civil-support operations.  
Chapter 4 specifically focuses on the DoD’s IRA provision to evaluate the impact of 
these foundations and to determine the various issues impacting this current DSCA 
activity.  The research focused on determining the overall effectiveness of the DoD’s IRA 
provision based on several core elements of successful military programs, to include:   
• Comprehensive Guidance 
• Effective Oversight 
• Comprehensive Organizational Design and Training 
• Comprehensive Strategic and Operational Planning 
• Supported by and Compliance with National/Military Policy and Strategy 
• Efficient Use of Resources 
• Effective Understanding and Communication between Key Participants 
Analysis of these core elements helped determine the overall strengths and 
weaknesses of the current IRA provision.  Operational guidance and historical use of the 
IRA provision was also reviewed and evaluated.  Based on the current limitations and 
barriers identified in Chapter 4, recommendations are provided in Chapter 5 which may 
help reduce or eliminate these barriers to eventually improve the overall effectiveness of 
this valuable local resource for city, state, and federal first responders. The long-term 
goal of this thesis is to clarify the DoD’s homeland security roles and missions.  These 
efforts will hopefully ensure a more effective and timely federal response to domestic 
emergencies by improving upon a provision in effect prior to the advent of the current 
debate on homeland security and defense. 
A.   KEY TERMS AND ISSUES 
One critical problem facing all levels of government in the area of emergency 
preparedness and response is jurisdiction:  The constant struggle to establish and define 
the roles of federal, state, and local governments and other entities.  Compounding this 
problem is the general lack of understanding or agreement on several critical terms and 
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issues.  What is Homeland Security?  What is Homeland Defense?  How does Homeland 
Security differ from Homeland Defense?  Who are considered first responders during 
domestic disasters?  What are the primary mechanisms for obtaining immediate federal 
assistance?  Can the DoD be the lead federal agency during immediate disaster response?  
Clarifying these key terms and issues are critical to improving national preparedness and  
understanding many of the issues this paper attempts to address and clarify.  Therefore, a 
small number of the more important terms and issues will be defined and highlighted 
from the start.     
What is Homeland Security and Defense and how do they differ?  
Homeland Security is defined as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, to reduce the vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”8  Homeland Security is a far-reaching 
security concept and involves initiatives and activities by various federal, state, local, and 
non-government organizations and all levels of government.  Homeland Defense on the 
other hand is considered primarily a military-centric activity.  Homeland Defense is 
currently defined as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic populations, 
and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats 
as directed by the President”9   
The fundamental difference between homeland defense and homeland security 
centers on responsibility.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is considered 
the lead federal agency for domestic incident management (and homeland security) in the 
U.S., while the Department of Defense considers homeland defense its primary 
responsibility.10  However, drawing a clear distinction between DHS and DoD roles and 
missions during some domestic events (such as a terrorist attack or catastrophic natural 
disaster) is more difficult.  Ongoing debates over appropriate roles and missions in 
                                                 
8 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2. 
9 Definition obtained from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 
available at: http://www.dod.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/hd/faqs/homelandDefense/index.html#q1, 
accessed 7 September 2006. 
10 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, (Washington, D.C., 
Department of Defense, June 2005), 5. 
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providing homeland security have continued to call on the federal government to pursue 
clearer delineations between DHS and DoD responsibilities.11  Over time, clarifying roles 
and missions will certainly help improve federal planning and coordination efforts. 
However, since both homeland security and defense are focused on the protection and 
safety of the U.S. and it citizens, these terms and security efforts should be considered 
more for their shared and concerted responsibilities than for their differences.   
Who are considered first responders during domestic disasters?  
According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, “America’s first line 
of defense in the aftermath of any terrorist attack (or disaster) is its first responder 
community.”12  Local and state entities typically considered the first responder 
community typically includes the following:13 
• Police Officers 
• Firefighters 
• Emergency Medical Providers 
• Public Works Personnel 
• Emergency Management Officials 
• National Guard Personnel (under the authority of a state governor)   
Traditionally, local and state governments have maintained the primary 
responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating emergency services to include the 
first responders to a domestic disaster or terrorist attack.14  However, in the aftermath of 
9/11, the U.S. government was forced to recognize that many seams existed within the 
national emergency response system’s plans, capabilities, and readiness.15  Numerous 
localities simply had little or no capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack using weapons 
                                                 
11 For further discussion related to the DoD’s roles and missions in Homeland Security and Civil 
Support see:  Department of Defense, DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, (Washington D.C., 
Defense Science Board 2003 Summer Study Report, Department of Defense, May 2004), and Thomas 
Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians and How, (University of Texas Press, 2006), 
Chapter 5. 
12 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 41. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 42. 
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of mass destruction, and even the best prepared states and localities did not possess the 
resources necessary to respond to the full spectrum of today’s terrorist threat.16  
Therefore, the federal government determined the need to create a fully integrated 
national response system that was adaptable to deal with any terrorist attack as well as all 
manner of natural disaster.17 As a result, the U.S. government directed an initiative to 
ensure federal, state, and local governments worked together to “ensure that all response 
personnel—including law enforcement, military, and environmental communities—were 
properly equipped, trained, and exercised to respond to all terrorist threats and attacks in 
the United States.”18  While this initiative brought substantial improvements, to include 
the development of a national response plan and incident management system, federal 
first responders (whether DHS, DoD, or other federal agencies) are still primarily 
considered an augmenting resource to state and local first responders.  The events of 
Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated the need for increased efforts toward the 
initiative to improve and clarify the roles, capabilities, and planning of local, state, and 
federal first responders.   
What are the primary mechanisms for obtaining immediate federal assistance?   
Though not adequately addressed or apparent to various levels of government and 
within first responder communities, there currently exist two primary mechanisms for 
obtaining immediate federal assistance during domestic disasters.  These two 
mechanisms are 1) the processes outlined by DHS in the National Response Plan (NRP) 
and 2) the ability to request immediate assistance from military units/agencies under the 
DoD’s Immediate Response Authority provision.   
1) DHS and the National Response Plan (NRP):  As the lead federal agency for 
domestic incident management and response, the DHS was charged with consolidating 
existing federal emergency response plans and to simplify the process by which 
governors, mayors, and county leaders’ interact with the federal government.19  Based on 
                                                 
16 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 42. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
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this mandate, the DHS developed and released the NRP in January, 2005.20  The NRP 
was intended to apply to all incidents requiring a coordinated federal response to include 
the anticipation of or in response to threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.21  According to the NRP, state governors may request assistance through a 
presidentially declared disaster or emergency when state resources and capabilities have 
become overwhelmed.22     
Although the NRP generally seeks to preserve the primary role of state and local 
bodies as first responders, it does recognize that some events will be so extreme or 
catastrophic that a greater proactive federal government response may be necessary.23  
Based on this recognized need, the NRP included a Catastrophic Incident Annex to 
establish the “context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an 
accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.”24  According to the 
Annex, the guiding principles for a proactive federal response include the following:25 
• Primary mission is to save lives, protect property and critical 
infrastructure, contain the event, and protect national security 
• Standard procedures outlined in the NRP regarding requests for assistance 
may be expedited, or under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended 
in the immediate aftermath of an incident of catastrophic magnitude, 
pursuant to existing law 
• Pre-identified federal response resources are mobilized and deployed, and 
if required, begin emergency operations to commence life-safety activities 
• Notification and full coordination with states occur, but the coordination 
process should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment 
of critical federal resources 
While the NRP provides this catastrophic incident provision to facilitate a more 
proactive federal assistance and response, the planning and preparedness for such 
                                                 
20 Keith Bea, The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress, (Washington D.C., 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 10 March 2005), 23. 
21 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, (Washington D.C., Department of 
Homeland Security, December 2004), 3.   
22 Ibid., 8. 
23 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 14. 
24 Ibid., 18. 
25 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Annex, 4. 
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activities among various federal agencies does not appear to be very robust and no final 
plan has been put into place to make this (Annex) operational.26 Consequently, the actual 
employment of (federal) resources still depends to a large degree on requests from local 
or state authorities and their joint participation in delivering aid to those in need.27   
2) DoD and the Immediate Response Authority (IRA) provision:  Although only 
briefly addressed in the NRP, another mechanism for obtaining immediate federal 
assistance is through the DoD’s IRA.28  Under the IRA provision, local military 
commanders (and responsible officials of other DoD components) are authorized to take 
“necessary action” to respond to requests from civil authorities.  Military commanders 
may provide immediate resources and assistance to civil authorities without prior 
approval or prior declaration under the NRP when a civil emergency or attack 
overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities.  According to the defense directive 
3025.1, these actions are authorized when imminently serious conditions necessitate 
immediate action “to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 
damage.”29   
Under their immediate response authority, DoD assistance may meet the 
following types of need:30 
• Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, 
maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and 
safeguarding the public health. 
• Emergency restoration of essential public services (including fire-fighting, 
water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel). 
• Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance from 
public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people 
and restoration of essential services. 
• Recover, identification, registration, and disposal of the dead 
                                                 
26 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 15. 
27 Ibid., 18. 
28 The NRP sites the Immediate Response Authority on pages 41-43 and in the Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex, 21. 
29 “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” DoD Directive 3025.1, 15 January 1993, para 4.5.1, 7. 
30  Ibid., para 4.5.4, 8. 
 9 
• Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical, and biological 
effects; controlling contaminated areas; and reporting through national 
warning and hazard control systems 
• Roadway movement control and planning 
• Safeguarding, collecting, and distributing food, essential supplies, and 
materiel on the basis of critical priorities 
• Damage assessment 
• Interim emergency communications 
• Facilitating the reestablishment of civil government functions 
To initiate assistance under the IRA provision, civil authorities are requested to 
provide a formal request (written or verbal) “to the nearest DoD Component or military 
commander.”31  Unlike the NRP, which stipulates requests for federal assistance must 
originate from a state governor, under the IRA provision, DoD officials may initiate 
assistance under appropriate IRA conditions (to save lives, prevent human suffering, or 
mitigate great property damage) when requested by a non-military federal, state, or local 
government agency.32  In the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 
commanders at nearby Fort Still and Tinker Air Force Base utilized the IRA provision to 
provide immediate military response and support to civil authorities.33   
The DoD’s IRA provision provides a valuable resource and mechanism for 
obtaining immediate federal assistance when circumstances dictate. As such, 
understanding and clarifying this provision (to include its application within the national 
preparedness system and the NRP) to all levels of government should be a national 
priority.    
Can the DoD become the lead federal agency during immediate disaster response?   
Yes.  Although in most cases, the DoD only provides support and assistance in 
response to requests from a lead or primary federal agency, the DoD’s IRA provision 
clearly authorizes and establishes circumstances in which U.S. military personnel could 
                                                 
31“Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” DoD Directive 3025.15, para 4.8.3, 8.   
32 Ibid., para E2.1.1 provides the definition of Civil Authorities, 16. 
33 Jim Winthrop, “The Oklahoma City Bombing:  Immediate Response Authority and other Military 
Assistance to Civil Authority (MSCA),” The Army Lawyer, (July 1997), 3 and 5. 
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potentially be the first and only federal responders to an incident.  Therefore, in such 
cases, the responding DoD contingent would essentially be the lead federal agency and 
would only transition to the DoD’s traditional supporting role, if and when, FEMA or 
another primary federal agency were activated and in place.  
The DHS and DoD have recently been urged to work together to revise the NRP 
to better delineate circumstances, objectives, and limitations of DoD temporary lead for 
federal responses to domestic catastrophic incidents.34  Clarifying and improving the 
DoD’s IRA provision will be a major part of this initiative.   
B.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The intent of this research is not to determine how the U.S. military’s role in 
domestic homeland security and disaster response can be expanded, but to evaluate and 
determine how current provisions for providing immediate military assistance in the 
aftermath of domestic disasters could be improved.  Consequently, the research focused 
on DoD’s Immediate Response Authority (IRA) provision and the effectiveness of its 
current strategy, oversight, and training.  The research also sought out recommendations 
to improve or better employ the IRA provision.  The primary research questions 
presented were:   
• How effective is strategic guidance, oversight, and training for the DoD’s 
IRA provision?  
• Are there ambiguities, gaps, and/or overlaps between the DoD’s IRA and 
local/state/DHS roles and missions? 
• What is the operational effect of these ambiguities and overlaps? 
• How can the DoD improve the IRA provision? 
• What steps are needed to clarify these domestic roles and missions? 
• Do the current Homeland Security and Homeland Defense definitions set a 
clear expectation of priorities for these domestic roles and missions? 
• What are the legal (and other barriers) to IRA effectiveness?  
• How can those barriers be overcome and/or mitigated? 
• How does domestic incidents, such as 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, help 
provide illustration of the expectations and issues regarding the DoD’s 
IRA and other federal (DHS) roles and missions? 
                                                 
34 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 94. 
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A preliminary literature review revealed that limited analysis and information has 
been written to address the issues raised by this thesis.  Consequently, information from 
various primary sources was utilized to assess the overall effectiveness of the DoD’s 
current Immediate Response Authority provision.  To do this, an extensive literature 
review was conducted to assess homeland security and emergency preparedness trends 
and issues that frame the debate about improving federal responses to domestic 
emergencies.  Second, current national strategy, doctrine, and policy were evaluated to 
identify strategic-level guidance that directly impacts national security and federal 
emergency preparedness and response.  Third, the U.S. military’s role in domestic 
disaster preparedness and response was reviewed to include current military strategy, 
guidance, and oversight for DSCA operations.  Finally, the military oversight, guidance, 
planning, and training components of the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority 
provision were reviewed in-depth to help determine the overall preparedness and 
effectiveness of this provision.  This effort involved identifying potential strategic, 
operational, and tactical barriers that may be limiting the provision’s current overall 
effectiveness.  Ultimately, this thesis provides recommendations for the U.S. 
Government, DHS, and the DoD which may help strengthen the DoD’s Immediate 
Response Authority provision, reduce the barriers to its effectiveness, and eventually 
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II. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE DURING DOMESTIC DISASTERS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Over the past 200 years, the federal government’s role in domestic disaster 
preparedness and response has evolved significantly, and with it the mechanisms by 
which it provides assistance.35  Early federal interventions and assistance, delivered in an 
ad hoc manner, would later evolve and become more formalized through federal 
emergency management legislation, initiatives, and organizational constructs.  However, 
throughout this evolution, the federal government’s role in disaster response has 
remained limited by design and hampered by persistent problems related to activating and 
coordinating timely federal response activities.  
Limiting the federal government’s role in disaster response reflects the American 
tradition of federalism.  According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
American democracy is deeply rooted in the precepts of federalism—a system of 
government in which state governments share power with federal institutions.  
Accordingly, local and state governments have the primary responsibility for funding, 
preparing, and operating the emergency services that respond to a wide range of 
catastrophes, including terrorist attacks.  Local units are, typically, the first to respond 
and the last to leave the scene.  Since most disasters are considered local events, disaster 
response in America has traditionally been handled by state and local governments, with 
the federal government playing a supporting role.36   
The precepts of federalism not only reflects in the national strategy, but also in the 
framework of the National Response Plan (NRP) which was established to provide a 
single, comprehensive approach to incident management to help prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from domestic attacks, disasters, and other emergencies.37  
According to the NRP, the basic premise of the plan is that incidents are generally 
                                                 
35 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 11. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Department of Homeland Security, Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 
(Washington D.C., Department of Homeland Security, 22 May 2006), 1. 
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handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible.  In the vast majority of incidents, state 
and local resources and interstate mutual aid agreements provide the first line of 
emergency response and incident management support.  When state resources and 
capabilities are overwhelmed, Governors may request federal assistance.38  This stair-
stepped approach to obtaining federal assistance has generated concern in recent years 
over the timing and effectiveness of federal aid.  The events of 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina, four years later, have brought into to question the precepts of federalism and 
have issued in new debate over the federal government’s appropriate role in providing 
homeland security, including domestic emergency preparedness and response.   
Today’s national preparedness system encompasses overlapping federal, state, 
and local governances and more than 87,000 different jurisdictions.39  According to the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, this dynamic provides unique opportunities and 
challenges for America’s homeland security efforts.  “The opportunity comes from the 
expertise and commitment of local agencies and organizations involved in homeland 
security.  The challenge is to develop interconnected and complementary systems that are 
reinforcing rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met.”40  A 
holistic approach is needed to maximize the federal government’s preparedness.  Federal, 
state, and local authorities will need to evaluate their interconnected preparedness efforts 
and build upon existing structures to improve disaster response and relief mechanisms.  
Ultimately, the federal government’s role in disaster response may require refinement, 
beyond the confines of federalism, to ensure effective federal preparedness and responses 
to domestic disasters.   
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
The U.S. government has provided support and assistance to local and state 
governments following natural disasters since the early days of the republic.  In 1803, in 
what is widely considered as the first federal intervention in a disaster scenario, the U.S. 
Congress approved the use of federal resources to assist the recovery of Portsmouth, New 
                                                 
38 Department of Homeland Security, Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 3. 
39 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security. vii. 
40 Ibid. 
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Hampshire, after a devastating urban fire.41  Over the next 120 years (1830-1950), the 
federal government intervened in over 100 incidents (earthquakes, fires, floods, and 
tornados) making federal resources and assistance available to the affected areas.42  These 
incidents of federal assistance and support were however, limited in scope and delivered 
in an ad hoc manner without a clearly established federal role or coordinated response 
methodology.43  Congress would simply charge a federal department and agency with the 
resources and personnel most pertinent to the given emergency (most often the armed 
forces or federal financing entities) to provide the required assistance.44  However, over 
time, the speed in which federal assistance was rendered and/or available became central 
to the efforts to improve and streamline federal policies and the agencies involved in 
providing disaster aid.  This growing need for effective and timely federal assistance 
eventually drove the federal government to evolve.  The federal government’s role 
became more formalized when the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 established the first 
comprehensive federal disaster relief law.45  Over the next 56 years, numerous executive 
orders, legislation, and agencies (such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
1978) were established to help improve and streamline federal assistance prior to, during, 
and after natural and man-made domestic disasters.  The major developments in 
emergency management and homeland security from 1947 to 2006 are provided in   




                                                 
41 National Academy of Public Administration, Coping With Catastrophe: Building Management: 
Principles and Practice for Local Government (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public 
Administration, 1993), 10, in The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned, 11. 
42 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 11. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Henry Hogue and Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative Options, (Washington D.C., Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 August 2006), 5. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., Appendix, 39-43. 
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Year  Authority  Organizational Development  
1947  National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 499).  National Security Resources Board (NSRB) is established.  
1949  Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949.  NSRB is transferred to the Executive Office of the President (EOP).  
1950  
Defense Production Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 
798), 
The Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) is established in the 
EOP.  
 followed by E.O. 10193  
 (Federal Register, vol.  
 
 15, Dec. 19, 1950, p. 9031).   
1950- 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 
1109),  
The act is the first comprehensive federal disaster relief law, and it 
delegates certain emergency  
1951  followed by E.O. 10221 (Federal 
Register, vol.  
management authorities to the President.  These authorities are 
delegated to the Housing and  
 16, Mar. 6, 1951, p. 2051).  Home Finance Administrator.  
1950  
E.O. 10186 (Federal Register, vol. 15, 
Dec. 5,  
The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) is established in 
the Office of Emergency  
 1950, p. 8557).  Management (OEM), a decade-old organization in the in the EOP.  
FCDA takes on some civil  
  defense activities previously performed by the National Security 
Resources Board.  
1951  
Civil Defense Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 
1245).  
FCDA is moved out of the EOP and established as an independent 
agency.  The Civil Defense  
  Advisory Council is established.  
1952  
E.O. 10346 (Federal Register, vol. 17, 
Apr. 19,  
FCDA is given a key role in assisting federal agencies with planning 
for service provision and  
 1952, p. 3477).  continued functioning during emergencies.  
1953  E.O. 10427 (Federal Register, vol. 18, 
Jan. 20, 1953, p. 407).  Emergency management authorities previously delegated to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator are redelegated to FCDA.  
FCDA is given additional responsibilities related to assisting federal, 
state, and local agencies with developing plans for disasters.  
1953  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953.  
New ODM is established with the functions of the old ODM as well 
as those of NSRB, which is abolished.  
1955  
E.O. 10638 (Federal Register, vol. 20, 
Oct. 13, 1955, p. 7637).  
ODM is given additional responsibilities related to releasing materials 
from stockpiles in the event of an enemy attack.  
1956  
E.O. 10660 (Federal Register, vol. 21, 
Feb. 18, 1956, p. 1117).  
ODM is given responsibility for the newly established National 
Defense Executive Reserve.  
1958  Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958.  All emergency management authorities of ODM and FCDA are 
transferred to the President, and these two organizations and CDAC 
are consolidated into the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization 
(ODCM) in the EOP.  
1958  E.O. 10773 (Federal Register, vol. 23, 
July 3, 1958, p. 5061).  The authorities transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 are redelegated to ODCM.  The Defense and Civilian 
Mobilization Board, comprising the ODCM Director and heads of 
federal departments and agencies, is established.  
1958  72 Stat. 861; E.O. 10782 (Federal 
Register, vol. 23, Sept. 10, 1958, p. 
6971).  
Congress renames ODCM the Office of Civil and Defense 
Mobilization (OCDM), and the President issues an executive order 
amending previous orders to reflect this change.  
1961  
E.O. 10952 (Federal Register, vol. 26, 
July 22, 1961, p. 6577).  
Certain civil defense functions are redelegated to the Secretary of 
Defense.  The Secretary of Defense establishes the Office of Civil 
Defense (OCD) to administer these functions.   
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1961  
E.O. 10958 (Federal Register, vol. 26, 
Aug. 16, 1961, p. 7571).  
Certain medical stockpile and food stockpile functions are redelegated 
from OCDM to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and 
the Secretary of Agriculture, respectively.  
1961  75 Stat. 630.  Congress renames OCDM the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP).  
1962  
E.O. 11051 (Federal Register, vol. 27, 
Oct. 2, 1962, p. 9683).  
The advisory and management functions of OEP are reaffirmed and 
expanded.  
1964  Administrative authority.  OCD is moved from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Department of the Army.  
1968  82 Stat. 1194.  Congress renames OEP the Office of Emergency Preparedness.  
1969  Disaster Relief Act of 1969 (83 Stat. 125). The federal government’s disaster relief responsibilities are expanded. 
1969  
E.O. 11495 (Federal Register, vol. 34, 
Nov. 20, 1969, p. 18447).  
The administration of many provisions of the Disaster Relief Act of 
1969 is delegated to OEP.  
1972  Administrative authority.  OCD, then located in the Department of the Army, is abolished.  In its 
place, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) is established 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  
1973  Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973.  Among other provisions, the plan abolishes OEP, and nearly all 
functions previously vested in that office or its director are transferred 
to the President.  The plan also abolishes the Civil Defense Advisory 
Council, which had been established in 1950.  
1973  E.O. 11725 (Federal Register, vol. 38, 
June 29, 1973, p. 17175).  
The functions transferred to the President by Reorganization Plan No. 
1 of 1973 are delegated to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), the General Services Administration (GSA), 
and the Department of the Treasury.  
1978  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.  The President proposes, and Congress agrees to, the merger of five 
agencies from the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Housing 
and Urban Development, as well as GSA, into one new independent 
agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
1979  E.O. 12127 (Federal Register, vol. 44, 
Apr. 3, 1979, p. 19367).  
To implement Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, certain functions 
are transferred to FEMA from the Department of Commerce (fire 
prevention and control; certain Emergency Broadcast System 
functions); the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(flood insurance); and the President (other Emergency Broadcast 
System functions).  
1979  E.O. 12148 (Federal Register, vol. 44, 
July 24, 1979, p. 43239).  
To implement Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, additional 
functions from the Departments of Defense (civil defense) and 
Housing and Urban Development (federal disaster assistance), GSA 
(federal preparedness), and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (earthquake hazards reduction) are transferred to FEMA.  
FEMA is also authorized to coordinate “all civil defense and civil 
emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance 
functions,” in addition to dam safety, “natural and nuclear disaster 
warning systems,” and “the coordination of preparedness and 
planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents.”  
The Federal Emergency Management Council, composed of FEMA 
and Office of Management and Budget Directors, and others as 
assigned by the President, is established.  
1993  Authority of the FEMA Director  
The National Preparedness Directorate, the entity concerned with 
national security emergencies, is eliminated.  
1996  
Authority of the President to establish 
Cabinet membership.  




Authority of the President to establish 
Cabinet membership.  
The incoming President does not extend Cabinet membership to the 
FEMA Director as he establishes his Administration.  
2001  Authority of FEMA Director  The President asks the FEMA Director to form an Office of National 
Preparedness, which was to “coordinate all Federal programs dealing 
with weapons of mass destruction consequence management.” [Joe 
M. Allbaugh, Memorandum to All FEMA Employees, “Functional 
Realignment,” June 5, 2001, Attachment C, p. 1.]  
2002  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 
107296, 116 Stat. 2135).  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is established.  The 
functions, personnel, resources, and authorities of six existing entities, 
the largest of which is FEMA, are transferred into the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Directorate.  Section 507 of the act 
specifically charges FEMA with “carrying out its mission to reduce 
the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards by 
leading and supporting the Nation in a comprehensive, risk-based 
emergency management program.”   
2003  
Department of Homeland Security 
Reorganization Plan.  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is implemented, and FEMA 
functions are transferred to DHS on Mar. 1, 2003.  
2004  Authority of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security under Section 872 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
Within DHS, organizational units are consolidated, and functions are 
reallocated.  Among other changes, “select grant award functions ... 
exercised by the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and 
Response,” under Sections 502 and 503 of the Homeland Security 
Act, are consolidated within the Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness, an office that is to report 
directly to the Secretary.  
2005  Authority of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security under Section 872 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
Most preparedness functions housed in the EPR Directorate are 
transferred to a newly created Preparedness Directorate.  FEMA 
becomes a freestanding unit, headed by a director, within DHS. The 
FEMA Director reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and directly oversees three divisions (Response, Mitigation, 
and Recovery) and numerous offices.  
2006  
Authority of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security under Section 872 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
The position of Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and 
Response is renamed Under Secretary for Federal Emergency 
Management.  The FEMA Director is placed in this position.  
  
Figure 1.   Major Emergency Management/Homeland Security Developments (From: 
Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization: 
Historical Developments and Legislative Options, Congressional Research 
Service, 1 August 2006, Appendix, 39-43) 
 
The centerpiece legislation for providing federal aid in disaster relief today is the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Stafford Act).47  The Stafford Act 
amended and expanded the federal government’s disaster relief provisions originally 
contained in the Disaster Relief Act of 1950.  Congress established the Stafford Act to 
provide assistance “state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to 
                                                 
47 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 12. 
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help alleviate the suffering and damage which result from disasters.48  The Act 
established a process for states to request a presidential disaster declaration in order to 
obtain federal assistance in responding to and recovering from events that exceed local 
and state capabilities and resources.49  However, the Act clearly respected the states’ 
primary role in determining when it was overwhelmed and what federal assistance was 
needed.  The Act also required the governor of a state to request the President to declare a 
major disaster or emergency for a portion or all of a state.  Such requests would need to  
describe how the states’ resources were overwhelmed.50  Once a governor’s request for 
assistance was received, the President could declare the incident a major disaster or 
emergency to initiate federal assistance reducing the time to initiate a federal response to 
a minimum.    
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the federal government went through one 
of the most sweeping reorganizations to help improve national security.  Much of the 
reorganization was focused on improving the nation’s ability to respond to domestic 
emergencies and disasters.  In the National Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July 
2002, President Bush called for a major initiative to create a fully integrated national 
emergency response system adaptable enough to deal with any terrorist attack, no matter 
how unlikely or catastrophic, as well as all manner of natural disasters.51  This initiative, 
proposed by the President, would be led by the soon-to-be created Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  According to the strategy, DHS would be charged with 
consolidating federal response plans, building a national system for incident 
management, and ensuring leaders at all levels of government have complete incident 
awareness and can communicate with and command all appropriate response personnel.52 
 
                                                 
48 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Committee Report, (Washington D.C., 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, May 2006), Chapter 13, 3. 
49 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Emergency Preparedness and Response, (Washington 
D.C., U.S. Government Accounting Office, 23 February 2006), 8. 
50 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Chapter 13, 4. 
51 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, National Vision, 42. 
52 Ibid. 
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The Homeland Security Act of 2002 officially established DHS and charged the 
new cabinet agency to lead the federal effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, natural disasters, and 
other emergencies; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist 
attacks and other disasters.53  Over the next three years, DHS undertook three major 
policy initiatives to help improve emergency preparedness and response.  “These 
initiatives included the development of the (1) National Response Plan (which helps 
clarify roles and responsibilities of various federal agencies); (2) National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), a command and management process to be used with the  
National Response Plan during an emergency (how to do what needs to be done); and (3) 
National Preparedness Goal (NPG), which identifies critical tasks and capabilities (how 
well it should be done).”54   
Implemented by the federal government in December 2004, the NRP was to 
provide an all-hazards plan established a single, comprehensive framework for managing 
domestic incidents across all levels of government and across a spectrum of activities that 
includes prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.55  According to the NRP, the 
scope of the plan covers the full range of complex and constantly changing requirements 
in anticipation of or in response to threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.56 
The first large-scale operational test of the newly adopted NRP came in late 
August of 2005, when Hurricane Katrina (a Category 5 hurricane) made landfall on the 
Gulf Coast of the United States just east of New Orleans, Louisiana.  The results were not 
good.  Katrina raised a number of questions about the federal government’s ability to 
respond effectively to catastrophic events—even one with several days warning.57  The 
basic assumption of the federal government being a supplement to state and local first 
                                                 
53 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 9. 
54 GAO, Emergency Preparedness and Response, 7.  
55 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 2.  
56 Ibid., 3. 
57 GAO, Emergency Preparedness and Response, 15. 
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responders was challenged by Katrina, which (1) “destroyed key communications 
infrastructure; (2) overwhelmed state and local response capacity, in many cases 
crippling their ability to perform their anticipated roles as initial on-site responders; and 
(3) destroyed the homes and affected the families of first responders, reducing their 
capacity to respond.”58 
Today, the need to clarify roles and responsibilities among local, state, federal 
first responders and improve intergovernmental coordination is vital to homeland 
security.  Due to the continuing threats of catastrophic terrorism and natural disasters, the 
federal government must improve upon the foundations of disaster relief and prepare for 
the larger role it may be called upon to play in response to a catastrophic event.59  To 
improve and possibly expand the federal government’s role in disaster relief will require 
a review of national-level goals and objectives which impact the national preparedness 
system and the current mechanisms in which federal agencies prepare, coordinate, and 
respond to domestic disasters.   
C. NATIONAL GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND INITIATIVES 
The U.S. government’s primary goals and objectives to prevent and mitigate the 
affects of domestic disasters are outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  
According to the strategy, the strategic objectives of homeland security (in order of 
priority) are to:60 
1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States 
2) Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism 
3) Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 
The third objective (to minimize damage and recover from attacks), according to 
the strategy, is achieved by the critical mission area of emergency preparedness and 
response.61  Effective responses to any emergency or disaster hinges on the preparedness 
of the various first responders and agencies that plan, train, and equip them.  As such, the 
strategy’s national vision for emergency preparedness states that “our federal, state, and 
                                                 
58 GAO, Emergency Preparedness and Response, 8. 
59 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 12. 
60 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, vii. 
61 Ibid., viii.  
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local governments” will “ensure that all response personnel and organizations—including 
law enforcement, military, emergency response, health care, public works, and 
environmental communities—are properly equipped, trained, and exercised to respond to 
all terrorist threats and attacks in the United States.”62  To adapt a metaphor, 
preparedness is the horse and response is the cart.  With that methodology in mind, the 
national strategy stresses the importance of preparedness and the need to create an 
effective national emergency response system.  “We need a comprehensive national 
system to bring together and command all necessary assets quickly and efficiently. We 
must equip, train, and exercise many different response units to mobilize for any 
emergency without warning.”63  To get to that point, the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security identified twelve major initiatives in the area of emergency preparedness and 
response:64 
1)   Integrate separate federal response plans into a single all-discipline 
incident management plan 
2)   Create a national incident management system 
3)   Improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities 
4)   Enable seamless communication among all responders 
5)   Prepare health care providers for catastrophic terrorism 
6)   Augment America’s pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles 
7)   Prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
decontamination 
8)   Plan for military support to civil authorities 
9)   Build the Citizen Corps 
10)   Implement the First Responder Initiative of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget 
11)   Build a national training and evaluation system 
12)   Enhance the victim support system  
In order to establish expectations and set deadlines for implementation of these 
national preparedness and response initiatives, the President issued several important 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
                                                 
62 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 42. 
63 Ibid., 41. 
64 Ibid., x. 
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required the adoption of the National Incident Management System or NIMS (which 
establishes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes 
for emergency event management) by all federal departments and agencies; and that 
federal preparedness grants would be dependent upon NIMS compliance by the 
recipients.65  The overlying premise being if state and local first responders implement 
NIMS in their response activities, the common terminology and knowledge of incident 
management would foster a more swift and effective response when emergency 
responders from various levels of government and locations respond to incidents.66     
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 required DHS to coordinate the 
development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal “to establish 
measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat 
and magnitude of terrorist attacks and large-scale natural or accidental disasters with the 
resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.”67  The national 
preparedness goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness 
assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness to 
respond to major events.68  To implement this directive, DHS developed 15 emergency 
event scenarios from which it established 37 target capabilities (as of December 2005) 
that federal, state, and local first responders should focus, develop, and maintain.69  Of 
these 37 target capabilities, 26 directly relate to emergency preparedness and response 
operations (Figure 2).  However, as of February 2006, DHS was still in the process of 
developing goals, requirements, and metrics for these capabilities.  Furthermore, in light 
of the events of Hurricane Katrina, DHS is reassessing both the NRP and the National 
Preparedness Goal initiative.70  This reassessment should involve critical analysis of the 
U.S. military’s role in homeland security and the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority. 
                                                 
65 GAO, Emergency Preparedness and Response, 9. 
66 Ibid., 9. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. 






• Risk management  
• Community preparedness and participation
RESPOND MISSION AREA:
• Onsite incident management 
• Emergency operations center management
• Critical resource logistics and distribution
• Volunteer management and donations
• Responder safety and health
• Public safety and security response
• Animal health emergency support
• Environmental health
• Explosive device response operations
• Firefighting operations/support WMD/hazardous materials response  
and decontamination
• Citizen Protection: evacuation and/or in-place protection
• Isolation and quarantine
• Urban search and rescue
• Emergency public information and warning
• Triage and pre-hospital treatment
• Medical surge
• Medical supplies management and distribution
• Mass prophylaxis
• Mass prophylaxis appendix
• Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services)
• Fatality management   
 
Figure 2.   Target Capabilities Related to Emergency Preparedness and Response 
(After:  Emergency Preparedness and Response, GAO Report, 23 Feb 06, 
18) 
 
D. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS WITH FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AND 
RESPONSE   
1. Ensuring Effective and Timely Federal Response 
Ensuring an effective and timely federal response to domestic disasters has been a 
persistent problem.  In 1992, the federal government’s response and management of 
catastrophic disasters was intensely criticized after Hurricane Andrew leveled much of 
South Florida and Hurricane Iniki destroyed much of the Hawaiian island of Kauai.  Prior 
to these storms, other major disasters, such as the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in 
California generated similar criticism of the federal response effort.71  During these 
incidents, the federal government’s strategy for responding to domestic disasters was 
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federal government to immediately assess the damage and needs of disaster victims (to 
include food, shelter, and other essential services) when local and state resources were 
overwhelmed.72  
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the federal government took on an 
initiative to better clarify roles and responsibilities of federal agencies during catastrophic 
disasters through the NRP.  However, the timing of a federal response is still somewhat 
constricted by the NRP’s foundational rule-of-thumb that “incidents are typically 
managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level” and 
the federal government is primarily a supplemental resource, as needed or required.73   
In order to clarify the methods and processes for obtaining immediate federal 
assistance, the DHS provided an appendix in the NRP which provides an overview of the 
federal government’s involvement under Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act situations.  
As illustrated in the NRP, Figure 3 depicts the “likely” federal actions under the Stafford 
Act and Figure 4 depicts the “likely” federal-to-federal agency support actions under 
non-Stafford Act situations in responding to domestic incidents.   
Although these processes are clearly illustrated, the underlying preparedness and 
methods for requesting and obtaining timely federal assistance during actual incidents are 
not.  One of the primary shortfalls with federal assistance has centered on the timing in 
which federal aid actually arrived at the disaster.  The response to Hurricane Andrew 
suffered from miscommunication and confusion of roles and responsibilities at all levels 
of government slowing the delivery of services vital to disaster victims.74  The federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina, guided by the newly established NRP, suffered a similar 
fate.   
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Figure 3.   Overview of Initial Federal Involvement under the Safford Act (From: 
National Response Plan, 93) 
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Figure 4.   Overview of Federal-to-Federal Support in Non-Safford Act Situations  
(From: National Response Plan, 95) 
 
During Hurricane Katrina, first responders were largely overwhelmed and unable 
to perform their duties.  The NRP also did not adequately provide a way for federal assets 
to quickly supplement or supplant (if necessary) local first responders.”75  The NRP’s 
mechanism for providing accelerated federal support, the Catastrophic Incident Annex, 
was not implemented.  According to the Select Bipartisan Committee’s report on 
Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary of DHS “should have invoked the Catastrophic Incident 
Annex” in order to switch the federal response posture from a “reactive” to a “proactive 
mode of operations.”76  According to the report, by failing to initiate the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, federal response officials in the field were forced to make decisions to 
bypass established procedures and provide assistance without waiting for “appropriate 
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requests from the states or clear orders from Washington.”77  Most of these decisions 
were made by individual federal officials, over several days, and in an uncoordinated 
fashion as circumstances required.  However, some point out that even if the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex had been initiated during Katrina, the actual employment of federal 
resources still depended to a large degree on individual requests from local or state 
officials and their joint  participation in delivering aid to those in need.78   
The federal government eventually stumbled into a proactive response and 
recover mode during Hurricane Katrina, but only after several critical days had passed 
since landfall.79  As a result of the delayed federal response during Katrina, the federal 
government is again being urged to not rely on the traditional layered approach and 
instead be better prepared to proactively provide (or ‘push’) its capabilities and assistance 
directly to those in need.80  The ability to push federal assistance is a responsibility that 
must be more explicitly acknowledged, planned, and coordinated for in the NRP, and the 
federal government must aggressively resource, train, and equip first responders to meet 
this critical national security obligation.81 
2. Ensuring Effective Intergovernmental Coordination and Operability   
Ensuring effective federal interagency coordination and operability during 
domestic disasters has also been a persistent problem over the years.  After the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government recognized a vital need for cooperation between 
federal, state, and local governments on a scale never before seen in the United States.82  
According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, cooperation must occur both 
horizontally (within each level of government) and vertically (among various levels of 
government.  As such, the federal government took on various initiatives to alter and 
improve the way the federal government and the nation coordinates and responds to 
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emergencies.  These coordination efforts helped result in the development of the NRP 
and the implementation of NIMS by the Department of Homeland Security.     
However, the ineffective national response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated to 
the nation that critical gaps in preparedness, coordination, and interoperability among 
responders at various levels of government persist within the national preparedness 
system.  Many of these gaps can be contributed to a limited coordination and 
preparedness strategy between key federal agencies.  According to the Select Bipartisan 
Committee Report, many federal agencies, including DHS, still have varying degrees of 
unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS.83  The 
current National Strategy for Homeland Security’s emphasis on interagency coordination 
and operability focuses primarily on improving the interaction between federal, state, and 
local levels (vertical coordination).  Nowhere in the strategy is there a strategic objective 
to horizontally coordinate the efforts of the various federal agencies to ensure mutual 
support and initiatives to “close gaps” or leverage resources.84  As such, horizontal 
coordination between federal agencies (i.e., DHS and DoD) to address gaps in disaster 
preparedness and response has been limited.  
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, several government reports have called on 
the federal government to address this persistent problem with intergovernmental 
coordination and operability.  “The federal government should work with its homeland 
security partners in revising existing plans, ensuring a functional operational structure—
including within regions—and establishing a clear, accountable process for all national 
preparedness efforts.  In doing so, the federal government must:”85       
• Ensure that Executive Branch agencies are organized, trained, and 
equipped to perform their response roles 
• Finalize and implement the National Preparedness Goal 
The overall responsibility of homeland security is not easily divided.  
Consequently, “a true national preparedness system” will need to “ensure that all levels 
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of government effectively work together to keep the American people safe and secure at 
home.”86  Creating a truly effective homeland security preparedness and response 
apparatus will require a holistic approach, comprised of federal, state, and local agencies 
(and partnerships with non-government/private industry) to be successful when disasters 
strike.  Clarifying and improving the U.S. military’s role in disaster preparedness and 
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III. MILITARY ASSISTANCE DURING DOMESTIC DISASTERS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The U.S. military has always played a significant role in providing support and 
assistance to domestic disasters; however, in the wake of 9/11, the relative and necessary 
role of the U.S. military in domestic homeland security missions (to include emergency 
preparedness and response) has became less clarified.  According to the DoD, the U.S. 
military currently contributes to homeland security efforts through its missions overseas, 
homeland defense operations, and through the support it provides to civil authorities.87  
However, the amount of homeland security roles and missions (to include DSCA) the 
U.S. military is prepared to take on has remained a matter of primary concern and center 
of debate for some time.  According to a 2003 Defense Science Board report, ever since 
FEMA was established in 1978, the DoD has considered its domestic emergency 
response role to be one of providing support or assistance to non-DoD civil authorities. 
“Military planners assume that civil agencies will always lead domestic emergency 
preparedness and response efforts, with the DoD providing resources only in response to 
appeals from state and local governments to the President.”88 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in late 2005, the debate and uncertainty over 
the DoD’s necessary role in domestic emergency preparedness and response was again 
center-stage.  The White House’s Hurricane Katrina after-actions report, titled “The 
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned” called on the DoD and DHS to 
delineate the circumstances, objectives, and limitations of when the DoD might 
temporarily assume the lead during federal responses to catastrophic incidents.89  This 
initiative to help improve and clarify the U.S. military’s role in federal emergency 
preparedness, planning, and response is well-justified and desperately needed. 
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B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In reviewing events from past U.S. disasters, it becomes obvious that one of the 
primary means the U.S. government utilizes to provide quick and robust federal 
assistance to civil authorities is through its military.  For example, following the 
aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005, the DoD deployed over 
22,000 and 72,000 military personnel, respectively, to help mitigate the affects of these 
disastrous storms.90  In providing federal assistance to catastrophic domestic disasters 
such as these, the DoD has long been considered “the only organization capable of 
providing, transporting, and distributing sufficient quantities of items needed” due to:91 
• The DoD having, for example, trained medical and engineering personnel, 
mobile medical units, storehouses of food and temporary shelters, 
contingency planning skills, command capability, resources for mass care, 
and the ability to transport these resources 
• Catastrophic relief activities mirror some of the DoD’s wartime support 
missions.  Soldiers are trained for similar missions, and catastrophic 
disaster relief provides soldiers with additional training 
• Catastrophic disaster response are smaller than many military operations 
and do not significantly affect DoD’s military readiness in the short term 
Despite these unique capabilities to help mitigate the affects of domestic disasters, 
the DoD has always sought only thin military “slices” of responsibility for domestic 
operations and has worked hard to keep them thin.  This effort to limit the scope of its 
role in domestic civil support operations reflects the fact that the DoD neither wants nor 
prepares extensively for civil-support operations on a continuing basis.92  This goes a 
long way in explaining the deep divide and levels of acceptance that currently exists 
between the military’s homeland defense and homeland security roles and missions.  
However, despite these varying levels of acceptance, the U.S. military’s homeland 
security and civil-support role and missions have continued to evolve.  While initial 
military interventions and assistance were primarily overseen and governed on a case-by-
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case basis, over time, various Executive orders, legislation, and other statutes were 
enacted to govern the U.S. military’s involvement in domestic emergency management 
and response.  In response to these Executive orders and statutes, the DoD developed and 
implemented numerous defense directives, programs, and organizations to establish a 
framework for providing military assistance through what is now called Defense Support 
to Civil Authorities (DSCA) activities.  
The process of creating DoD organizations specifically focused on DSCA and 
other homeland security operations began in the 1950s with the establishment of the 
North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) Command.  However, NORAD was 
primarily designed and focused on protecting America from Soviet and other external 
threats.  Following the end of the cold war, the DoD took on new initiatives to help 
improve and clarify military domestic support and assistance.  In early 1993, the DoD 
issued an updated directive, DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities 
(MSCA), to help consolidate all policy and responsibilities applicable to disaster-related 
civil emergencies.93  The directive assigned the Secretary of the Army as the DoD’s 
Executive Agent for DSCA activities which permitted the Secretary to task DoD 
Components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) to plan for and commit resources in 
response to requests for military assistance.94  To assist in these duties, the Secretary of 
the Army was required to establish a single headquarters element (Directorate of Military 
Support–DOMS) to coordinate and issue necessary deployment orders for DSCA 
activities.95 The directive also called on the Commander in Chief, Forces Command 
(Army); the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command; and the Commander in Chief,  
U.S. Pacific Command, to lead military assistance planning activities within their 
geographical areas:96   
• Forces Command – 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia 
• U.S. Atlantic Command – Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
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• U.S. Pacific Command – Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. possessions and 
territories in the Pacific area 
In the late 1990s, additional DoD guidance and military organizations to guide 
domestic military assistance were established.  In 1997, the DoD released DoD Directive 
3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).  This directive was designed to 
further establish DoD policy and responsibilities for providing domestic military 
assistance.97  The directive established the following six criteria against which all 
requests for military assistance should be evaluated:98  
• Legality (compliance with laws) 
• Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces) 
• Risk (safety of DoD forces) 
• Cost (who pays, impact on DoD budget) 
• Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of the 
Department to conduct) 
• Readiness (impact on DoD’s ability to perform its primary mission) 
Increased concerns over national security and the potential for terrorist attacks 
prompted military reorganization in the late 1990s.  On 1 October 1999, the U.S. Joint 
Forces Command created a new military organization, Joint Task Force-Civil Support 
(JTF-CS), to help provide military support to civil authorities during the aftermath of a 
domestic catastrophe.  Headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, JTF-CS was designed the 
primary responsibility of planning and integrating DoD support to assist lead federal 
agencies in responding to “a deliberate or unintentional event involving a nuclear, 
biological, chemical, radiological weapon or device, or large conventional explosive, that 
produces catastrophic loss of life or property.”99   
In 2000, the DoD also issued a directive to provide policy and guidance governing 
the use of Reserve component members under the Military Emergency Preparedness 
Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program.  According to the directive, EPLO’s would provide 
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support to military organizations and to civil authorities (i.e., FEMA) during military 
civil-support operations.100  Overall EPLO policy and program oversight was assigned to 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and to each Secretary of the 
Military Departments for their service’s assigned EPLOs.101    
On September 11, 2001, however, most of the previous steps toward improving 
the military’s homeland security and domestic civil-support operations would amount to 
mere steppingstones to the larger initiatives the DoD would need to take to ensure 
disaster preparedness in a new security environment faced with global terrorism.  In the 
aftermath of 9/11, the DoD’s role in disaster preparedness and response became a subject 
of national debate and research.  Highlighted in a 2003 Defense Science Board’s study on 
the DoD’s roles and missions in homeland security, the U.S. military’s “support model… 
described as:  Call us when you need us and we’ll do all we can… had two very 
considerable problems.”102  1) “A WMD attack may well call for the immediate 
deployment of equipment or capabilities that no local or state government can afford to 
maintain. 2) “There is a built-in response delay as federal officials respond to local and 
state government requests for resources:  units must be identified, equipment issued, and 
transportation arranged.”103  As a result of these inherent problems, the panel highlighted 
that often times “the supported officials and the supporting commander meet for the first 
time at the scene of an emergency.  This delay and possible confusion (at the scene) 
could result in additional damage, additional casualties, or the further spread of a 
chemical or biological agent.”104   
Concerns and problems within the national preparedness and response apparatus, 
such as those identified by the Defense Science Board, prompted several federal 
initiatives to clarify the DoD’s domestic roles and missions following 9/11.  The DoD’s 
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traditional supporting role in domestic civil-support operations was addressed in a key 
Presidential Directive and the NRP.105  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 
(HSPD-5), released in February 2003, specified that the “DoD will provide military 
assistance to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when 
consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the 
law.”106  The directive required the DoD to adopt the use of the National Incident 
Management System for disaster preparedness and response, and to also work with the 
DHS to establish “appropriate” relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and 
coordination between the two Departments.107  Under the NRP, the DoD’s key 
supporting role during domestic disasters was address in “virtually the same language as 
that used in HSPD-5.” 108  According to the NRP, the “DoD has significant resources that 
may be available to support the federal response to an Incident of National 
Significance.”109  However, the terminology “may be available” and “support,” clearly 
reflected the continuation of the traditional supporting role and case-by-case assistance 
expected from the DoD and the U.S. military during domestic incidents.  In addition to 
establishing the DoD’s general supporting role, the NRP also identified the DoD as a 
supporting resource to a lead agency within the NRP’s Emergency Support Functions  
(ESFs), “reflecting the fact that DoD has unique resources and capabilities to provide 
humanitarian relief in a catastrophe.”110  Figure 5 provides information on the DoD’s 
specifically assigned roles under the NRP’s 15 ESFs.111 
Though the DoD’s traditional supporting role in civil-support operations was left 
virtually unaltered, the DoD underwent massive reorganization to help improve 
homeland security and civil-support operations.  On 30 April 2002, President Bush 
signed a new DoD Unified Command Plan which established a new combatant 
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command, the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), to provide command and 
control over the DoD’s “homeland defense efforts and to coordinate military support to 
civil authorities.”112  USNORTHCOM’s area of primary responsibility was defined as 
the “air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, 
Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.  It also 
includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.”113  To help 
clarify USNORTHCOM’s role in disaster preparedness and response, the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security required that the commander of USNORTHCOM update 
“plans to provide military support to domestic civil authorities in response to natural and 
man-made disasters and during national emergencies.”114  In addition to the creation of 
USNORTHCOM, the signing of the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act in late 
2002 established the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense (ASD-HD).  The ASD-HD’s primary responsibilities are to “develop policies, 
conduct analyses, provide advice, and make recommendations on homeland defense, 
defense support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness, and domestic crisis 
management matters within the DoD.”115   
Despite the initiatives and reorganization to clarify the roles and responsibilities at 
the strategic-levels of the DoD after 9/11, one significant question was left unresolved in 
the area of domestic disaster preparedness and response:  How can the DoD improve its 
current mechanisms for providing disaster preparedness and response?  In the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina in late 2005, the DoD’s overall approach to planning and 
responding to domestic emergencies resulted in criticism, debate, and some calls for 
transformation to improve the U.S. military’s response to catastrophic incidents.  
President Bush introduced the prospect of expanding the military’s role in internal 
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missions including civil-support operations during a post-Katrina interview in which he 
contended that such events in the future may “require greater federal authority and a 
broader role for the armed forces.”116   
 
 
Figure 5.   DoD’s Assigned Roles under the National Response Plan’s ESFs.       
(From: Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Chapter 26, 4)                                                  
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In response to this criticism, the DoD has also deemed it reasonable to reexamine 
and perhaps redefine the DoD’s role in response to truly catastrophic events.  “It may be 
time to raise the bar, tighten our plans, and achieve an even higher more rapid and 
effective military response in some future catastrophic event.  Our performance was 
better then our plans (during Hurricane Katrina), and its time to close that gap” remarked 
Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.117    
C. LEGAL PERSPECTIVE  
Military involvement in U.S. domestic affairs, including civil support, eventually 
drew criticism and debate.  Most of the criticism centered on concerns and preferences to 
limit the federal government’s central control (or federalism) and the military’s domestic 
activities due to its perceived impact on civil liberties.  As such, provisions were set in 
place over time to limit the scope and use of the U.S. military in domestic operations.  
Today, the legal basis for DSCA rests upon a wide range of provisions including 
constitutional and statutory authorities, as well as defense directives, regulations, and 
other agreements between the DoD and local, state, and federal authorities/agencies. 
DSCA has remained the DoD’s primary domestic mission grounded in the 
provisions of the US Constitution, which states that “Congress shall have power… to 
provide for calling forth the militia to execute laws of the union, suppress insurrection, 
and repel invasions.118  The Constitution also emphasizes the role of the national military 
in law enforcement operations: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them… against 
domestic violence.”119  
Various current legal statutes govern DoD participation in domestic disaster relief 
operations.  These statutes establish pre-disaster and disaster response reimbursement 
procedures, authorize the use of military forces to put down insurrection, and generally 
prohibit the use of the military from performing law enforcement roles except in 
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responses to insurrections and/or where authorized by the Constitution or acts of 
Congress.  Applicable statutes include the following: 
• Economy Act – This act “permits federal agencies to provide goods or 
services to another federal agency when such support is requested.  Such 
assistance will not necessarily be related to disaster response.”120  
• Stafford Act – This act is the “primary statute governing DoD and other 
federal agency disaster assistance under the NRP.  Stafford Act 
reimbursements are authorized once the Governor has asserted that state 
capabilities are overwhelmed and federal assistance is needed, and the 
President has declared an emergency.”121 
• Insurrection Act – This act “authorizes the President to use military force 
to suppress an insurrection or end other domestic violence.  Specifically, 
the President may employ military forces to restore order, prevent looting, 
and engage in other law-enforcement activities.”122 
• Posse Comitatus Act – This act makes it a criminal offense to use the 
Army or Air Force to execute law enforcement functions unless authorized 
by the Constitution or Congress.  Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus 
Act to restrict the use of federal troops in conducting law enforcement in 
the South during the Reconstruction period.123  Federal courts have 
generally interpreted the Act to prohibit the use of military troops from 
participating in law enforcement activities such as search, seizure, and                       
arrest.  The DoD has also issued policy guidance extending the act’s 
restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corps; however, these restrictions do 
not apply to the National Guard when under the direct command of a 
state’s Governor.124  Furthermore, while the act’s applicability is primarily 
limited to law enforcement activities, some argue that the act is often cited 
(and sometimes misrepresented) by military leaders in order to limit the 
military’s domestic operations and maintain combat-readiness.125  
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The U.S. Congress has also created a number of specific exceptions to the general 
restrictions in the Posse Comitatus Act to authorize the use of DoD personnel and 
equipment for certain roles and missions including:126  
• Assisting with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions 
• Protecting civil rights or property, or suppress insurrections 
• Assisting the U.S. Secret Service 
• Protecting nuclear materials and assist in solving crimes involving nuclear 
material 
• Assisting with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass 
destruction 
• Assisting with the execution of quarantine and certain public health events 
While numerous statutes that have been established to govern the role and use of 
the U.S. military in domestic affairs, the legal authority for the majority of DSCA 
operations is the Stafford Act.  However, there is one current exception outside of the 
Stafford Act framework which provides U.S. military commanders with the authority to 
respond to domestic emergencies and disaster relief operations--the DoD’s Immediate 
Response Authority provision. 127   This authority, addressed in several DoD directives 
and within the NRP, allows military commanders to respond to assistance requests from 
civil authorities without prior approval or Presidential declaration.   
Following the aftermath of 9/11, the President’s National Strategy for Homeland 
Security called for a review of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic 
security operations.  According to the strategy, “the threat of catastrophic terrorism 
requires a thorough review of the laws permitting the military to act within the United 
States in order to determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would 
benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, how.”128  However, it 
is unclear if any review has been conducted by the federal government up to this date.   
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D. MILITARY STRATEGY, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES  
Today’s DSCA strategy and activities are grounded in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, which identifies three specific circumstances under which the DoD 
would be involved in homeland security and domestic civil-support:129 
1) In extraordinary circumstances, to conduct military missions such 
as combat air patrols or maritime defense operations 
2) During emergencies such as responding to an attack or to forest 
fires, floods, tornadoes, or other catastrophes, as well as to assist 
during national special events.  In these circumstances, the DoD 
may be asked to act quickly to provide capabilities that other 
agencies don’t have. 
3) During “limited scope” missions where other agencies have the 
lead (i.e., Olympics or Presidential Inaugurations)  
Using the circumstances outlined in the national strategy, the DoD developed and 
provided the U.S. military’s primary strategy, goals, and objectives for providing DSCA 
within the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support released in 2005.  
The strategy attempts to focus military activities to achieving the DoD’s paramount 
goal—securing the United States from attack.130  According to the strategy document, the 
DoD’s activities to protect the United States generally fall into one of the following three 
categories:131  
Lead:  At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the 
Department of Defense executes military missions that dissuade, deter, 
and defeat attacks upon the United States, our population, and our defense 
critical infrastructure. 
Support:  At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the 
Department of Defense provides support to civil authorities.  This support 
is part of a comprehensive national response to prevent and protect against 
terrorist incidents or recover from an attack or disaster.  DoD provides 
support to a lead Federal agency when directed by the President or the 
Secretary of Defense. 
Enable:  The Department of Defense seeks to improve the homeland 
defense and homeland security contributions of our domestic and  
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international partners and, in turn, to improve DoD capabilities by sharing 
expertise and technology, as appropriate, across military and civilian 
boundaries. 
Within this lead, support, and enable framework for providing homeland defense 
and civil support, the DoD has focused on five primary objectives and has identified them 
in order of priority.  These objectives are:132 
Priority #1 – Achieve maximum awareness of potential threats 
Priority #2 – Deter, intercept and defeat threats at a safe distance 
Priority #3 – Achieve mission assurance 
Priority #4 – Support civil authorities in minimizing the damage from 
domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 
explosive (CBRNE) mass casualty attacks 
Priority #5 – Improve national and international capabilities for homeland 
defense and homeland security 
In examining these objectives and their requisite core capabilities (Figure 6), it 
becomes clearly obvious that the first two objectives are primarily focused on the 
military’s core homeland defense and traditional warfighting missions.  These priorities 
focus DoD efforts to obtain timely and accurate threat awareness and to proactively use 
this information “to identify, track, and intercept threats long before they threaten this 
nation.”133  The third priority, to achieve mission assurance, is also DoD-centric in that it 
focuses on the protection of DoD forces, defense infrastructure, and defense crisis 
management and continuity of operations ensuring the survivability of “DoD assets and 
U.S. military forces.”134  While the forth priority focuses on the DoD’s traditional 
capabilities and efforts to provide DSCA, the only core capability specifically identified 
is the need to provide consequence management support following chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 
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Figure 6.   DoD Objectives and Core Capabilities for Protecting the United States    
(From:  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 15) 
 
(CBRNE) attacks. According to the objective, “the potential for multiple, simultaneous, 
CBRNE attacks on U.S. territory is real.  It is therefore imperative that the DoD be 
prepared to support civilian responders in responding to such mass casualty events.”135  
Therefore, the primary initiatives and core capabilities to improve national preparedness 
and incident management efforts are contained in the DoD’s last key objective—to 
improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and homeland 
security.  According to this objective, improving interagency planning and 
interoperability will require “active DoD participation” to “ensure that procedures for 
supporting civil authorities are consistent with the framework for domestic incident  
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response” as outlined in the NRP and NIMS.136  To improve federal, state, and local 
partnership capacity and effective domestic relationships, the DoD identified three tenets 
to improve DSCA:137 
1)  Augment civil capabilities with DoD expertise where 
necessary 
2)  Ensure the seamless operational integration of defense 
support capabilities with those of the civil sector 
3)   Assist in the civil sector’s development and procurement of 
new technologies and equipment 
Within these three tenets, the DoD identified three initiatives currently underway 
to strengthen civilian capabilities:138 
1)   Development of CBRNE victim rescue capabilities  
2)  Research and development, and civilian acquisition of 
unmanned aerial vehicles for law enforcement and ground 
surveillance systems for boarder security 
3)   Development of an attack prevention and recovery plan and 
technical advice and analysis regarding Man-Portable Air 
Defense System (MANPAD) weapons 
According to the DoD, these initiatives “can increase the overall effectiveness of 
national capabilities and potentially reduce other agencies’ dependencies on limited DoD 
assets.”139  Clearly these initiatives and objectives are important.  Reducing the 
dependency on DoD assets will help the DoD focus on what the Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support places “premium” and “primary responsibility”— protecting 
the US homeland from attack.140  However, based on this priority, the DoD admittedly 
“accepts some risk” in its limited efforts in achieving its “enable” objectives (including 
DSCA activities) to more effectively address what the DoD considers a more immediate 
(or military-centric) need, the “lead” and “support” objectives.141  The DoD must bear in 
mind that prevention, deterrence, and the reduction on military dependency will only be 
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effective in certain scenarios and certain disasters.  Domestic disasters (whether natural 
or man-made) will happen again; it’s just a matter of where and when.  Therefore, 
improving the current mechanisms for providing military assistance is an initiative of 
vital importance. Unfortunately, it is an initiative that has been left dangerously vague 
and with limited priority within the DoD’s current primary strategy for governing 
military civil-support.   
E. CURRENT MECHANISMS FOR OBTAINING MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
According to several sources, there currently exist three primary mechanisms for 
obtaining military response and assistance to a domestic disaster.142  These primary 
mechanisms include:143    
1)  At the direction of the President 
2)  If the Secretary of DHS declares an event an Incident of 
National Significance (under the NRP) 
3)  At the request of a Governor of an affected state and in 
support of a lead federal agency 
The first mechanism recognizes the President’s inherent constitutional authority 
to call on military forces to restore order, prevent looting, and engage in other law-
enforcement activities during events of domestic insurrection.144  The second and third 
mechanism recognizes the federal government’s response authority provided under the 
Economy Act, the Stafford Act, and within the NRP’s principles for proactive federal 
responses to catastrophic events.  While these are the general and most commonly 
utilized means of obtaining military assistance, they are not only avenues for obtaining 
DoD support. 
Though not adequately addressed or apparent to various levels of government and 
first responder communities, there currently exists two primary alternatives for requesting 
and obtaining DoD assistance during domestic disasters.  The first, and most common, is 
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through the U.S. military’s established role in providing domestic assistance through the 
DoD’s DSCA construct.  The means of requesting and activating DSCA activities 
generally apply to the three typical activation mechanisms mentioned above.  The second 
and least understood resources and means of obtaining immediate DoD assistance is 
through the U.S. military’s Immediate Response Authority.  A general overview of these 
two important resources is provided in the following sections.   
1. Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) 
DSCA generally “refers to DoD support provided by federal military forces, DoD 
civilians and contract personnel, and DoD agencies and components, in response to 
requests for assistance during domestic disasters, incidents to include terrorist threats or 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”145  According to the NRP, in most 
instances, the DoD provides DSCA in response to requests from a lead or primary 
agency.146 These DSCA requests are typically “made to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Executive Secretariat” and require “approval of the Secretary of Defense in 
order to obligate DoD assets to provide support.”147  As a general rule, DSCA activities 
are normally only authorized and provided “when local, state, and federal resources are 
overwhelmed, provided that it (assistance) does not interfere with the Department’s 
military readiness or operation.”148 
To facilitate and guide DSCA activities, the DoD has developed and implemented 
numerous defense directives, programs, and organizations to establish a framework for 
providing military assistance.  An overview of the current DSCA framework and 
establishment is provided below: 
a. Defense Directives and Guidance 
DoD directives and guidance governing DSCA activities can be found in 
several primary documents.  These primary documents include: 
• Military Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support  
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• Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept 
• Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security 
• DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities 
• DoD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 
• DoD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
b. Key DoD Positions and Organizations Responsible for DSCA  
(1) Secretary of Defense (SecDef).  The SecDef authorizes 
DSCA activities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent 
with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law.  
The SecDef “retains command of military forces under DSCA, as with all other situations 
and operations.”149  Although, it is worth noting that this command authority does not 
currently pertain to non-federalized National Guard members participating in civil-
support operations under the authority of a state governor.150   
(2) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
(ASD-HD).  The ASD-HD develops “policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, and 
make recommendations on homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities, 
emergency preparedness, and domestic crisis management matters within the DoD.”151   
(3) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).  The CJCS is 
responsible for coordinating with and assisting commandant commands (two are 
discussed below) “with strategic direction and planning for, as well as execution of, 
homeland defense and civil support missions.”152  The primary DSCA guidance currently 
provided by the CJCS is contained within Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security.153 
(4) Joint Director of Military Support (JDOM).  All requests 
for DSCA, “except those provided under mutual aid agreements or in response to 
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imminently serous conditions,” are processed by the JDOM.154  Located within the JCS, 
the JDOM receives requests for military assistance, “produces military orders as they 
pertain to domestic emergencies and forwards them to the SecDef for approval.”155  
Upon SecDef approval, the JDOM then forwards the order “to the appropriate military 
commander for execution.”156  The JDOM may translate SecDef or ASD-HD guidance 
into operational orders without or without formal requests for emergency assistance.   
(5) Combatant Commands (COCOM).  There are two primary 
commandant commands responsible for overseeing the planning, organizing, and 
execution of DSCA operations within the United States and its territories.  U.S. Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM), headquartered in Colorado Springs, CO, is responsible for 
DSCA “within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters.  It also 
coordinates security cooperation with Canada and Mexico” and oversees operations in 
the “costal approaches, the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.”157  
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), headquartered in Honolulu, HI, is responsible for 
DSCA activities within “Hawaii and US territories, possessions, and freely associated 
states in the Pacific.”158 
Once requests for DSCA assistance is approved by the SecDef, the 
Secretary generally “designates a supported combatant commander for the response.”159  
Once designated the authority to provide assistance, the “combatant commander 
determines the appropriate level of command and control” necessary for the particular 
incident.  In response to most incidents of limited severity, the COCOM’s will designate 
“a senior military officer to deploy to the incident site” to oversee DoD activities and 
“serve as the single point of contact.”160 When responding to significant disasters, such 
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as Hurricane Katrina, “the supported combatant commander may utilize a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) to consolidate and manage” DSCA operations. As of August 2006, the 
COCOM’s have established several Joint Task Forces, comprised of over 400 military 
and civilian personnel, to facilitate various DSCA activities, they include:161 
• Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (USNORTHCOM) 
• Joint Task Force North (USNORTHCOM) 
• Joint Task Force Civil Support (USNORTHCOM) 
• Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (USNORTHCOM) 
• Joint Task Force Homeland Defense (USPACOM) 
(6) DoD Components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines).  
In addition to the overall responsibilities of the individual COCOMs, individual DoD 
components have also been mandated key responsibilities to manage and support DSCA.  
According to DoD directive, the Secretaries of the military departments are to “provide 
for participation” in DSCA activities and “ensure readiness of Active and Reserve forces 
to execute plans for DSCA.” 162  The individual services are also directed to provide and 
assign Reserve personnel, “based on validated military planning and operational 
requirements,” to FEMA and other agencies to “provide liaison for planning” for DSCA 
operations.163  To provide a framework and oversight for these Reserve liaison positions, 
the DoD establish policy and guidance governing the Emergency Preparedness Liaison 
Officer (EPLO) Program.164    
(7) Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO).  
EPLOs serve as the primary interface between their service’s (DSCA) planning agent and 
their assigned command or agency (i.e., FEMA)165  EPLOs are “assigned by the military 
services and selected DoD agencies to coordinate the use of DoD resources in support of 
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civil authorities during Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies.”166  “EPLO 
teams are assigned to each state (and U.S. Territory) and each FEMA region, consisting 
of officers and noncommissioned officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  Marine 
Corps Reserve officers are assigned to each FEMA region, but also support states within 
their region as needed.”167  When disasters strike, EPLOs often “deploy to national or 
regional incident command centers, such as the Homeland Security Operations Center 
(within DHS), to coordinate the DoD response to the event.”168  The DoD provides the 
following general guidelines for EPLO positions:169 
• EPLOs shall be highly qualified senior-level officers (O-5/O-6) 
• Completion of the DoD EPLO Course conducted by FEMA170  
• Participation in at least one national, regional, or state emergency response 
training exercise (natural disaster or weapon of mass destruction) every 18 
months 
• Participation in an annual National Joint EPLO Conference/Workshop 
Although the DoD provides these general EPLO guidelines and 
has delegated general DoD oversight responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs, significant program oversight and management has been 
assigned to the individual military departments.171  Each service department, notably the 
Air Force, Army, and Navy, have been required to establish “a single point of contact 
(planning agent) responsible for managing and coordinating” EPLO activities.  Each 
service also determines how many EPLOs will be sourced (for example, the Air Force 
currently maintains over 100 EPLOs and the Army maintains over 200),172 where they 
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will be assigned, and also how they will be utilized and trained.173  As such, the specific 
duties, day-to-day responsibilities, and roles of each EPLO during the preparation for, or 
response to, an actual domestic disaster will vary by assignment and military department.   
(8) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).  In addition to the 
coordinating resource offered by EPLOs, the DoD has also provided specialized training 
to various senior military officers (in the grade of O-6) to coordinate DSCA operations.  
When disasters strike, these officers may be activated to deploy as a DCO to the Joint 
Field Office or another emergency management command center to orchestrate military 
support.  When activated, the DCO may be augmented with a military and civilian staff 
(known as a Defense Coordinating Element) to assist the DCO carry out their assigned 
duties.174   
2. Immediate Response Authority (IRA) 
Although only briefly addressed in the NRP, another viable resource and means 
of obtaining immediate military assistance is through the DoD’s IRA.175  Under the 
DoD’s IRA provision, local military commanders (and responsible officials of other DoD 
components) are authorized to take “necessary action” to respond to requests from civil 
authorities.  Military commanders may provide immediate resources and assistance to 
civil authorities without prior approval or prior declaration under the NRP when a civil 
emergency or attack overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities.  According to the 
defense directive, these actions are authorized when imminently serious conditions 
necessitate immediate action “to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great 
property damage.”176  Unlike the NRP, which stipulates requests for federal assistance 
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assistance under appropriate IRA conditions (to save lives, prevent human suffering, or 
mitigate great property damage) when requested to by a non-military federal, state, or 
local government agency.177   
The DoD’s IRA provision provides a unique resource and mechanism for 
obtaining immediate federal assistance when circumstances dictate.  Clearly, in the 
immediate aftermath of an attack or disaster, the prompt assistance provided by local 
military installations and agencies may be the vital and critical enabler to mitigate the 
disaster and its affects.  As such, understanding and clarifying this provision, to include 
its application in the national preparedness system and NRP, should be a national 
priority.  Further details of the IRA provision and the various barriers to its current 
overall effectiveness are provided in the following chapter.  
F. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS AND ISSUES WITH MILITARY DOMESTIC 
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE  
Although the U.S. military has typically received high praise for its overall 
support and assistance during domestic disasters, the DoD’s policies and preparedness to 
provide timely DSCA has been subject of concern and debate.  Many believe the U.S. 
military should be more prepared to assist local, state, and federal agencies mitigate the 
affects of man-made and natural disasters.  In response to the criticism stemming from 
the DoD response to Hurricane Katrina, the DoD has deemed it reasonable to reexamine 
and perhaps redefine the DoD’s role in response to truly catastrophic events.  “It may be 
time to raise the bar, tighten our plans, and achieve an even higher more rapid and 
effective military response in some future catastrophic event.  Our performance was 
better then our plans (during Hurricane Katrina), and its time to close that gap” remarked 
Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security.178  Closing this gap 
will certainly require evaluation and remedy of the persistent problems and issues facing 
DoD disaster preparedness and response operations.  
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1. Lack of Clearly Established DoD Roles and Missions  
The DoD has taken significant organizational steps to help improve and 
streamline the management of DSCA operations.  In creating ASD-HD, 
USNORTHCOM, and the various Joint Task Forces, the DoD has helped clarify specific 
responsibilities, roles, and missions for domestic preparedness and response activities.  
However, some would argue these efforts do not go far enough.  Many believe that the 
national security environment changed so significantly after 9/11 to warrant the DoD 
taking a more active role in disaster emergency preparedness and response and that the 
current policies that prescribe the role of the DoD (in these responses) are simply 
inadequate for the threats and potential disasters the nation faces today.179    
Admittedly, there is a large and complex set of issues associated with any 
intrusion of the DoD in domestic affairs.  On one hand, most citizens recognize there is a 
role for the military in homeland defense.180  What is less clear is what role, if any, the 
DoD should play in preparing for and responding to major terrorist attacks.181  As such, 
the U.S. government, DHS, and DoD must continue to evaluate the U.S. military’s role 
and missions in providing DSCA and immediate disaster response (under the DoD’s 
Immediate Response Authority) and clarify these missions and ambiguities within the 
NRP, NIMS, and throughout the first responder community. 
2. Lack of Clarity Regarding the Mechanism for Requesting Military 
Support under the Immediate Response Authority 
Active-duty military personnel can only act in support of a lead federal 
civilian agency, in this case the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
which is part of the Department of Homeland Security.   
      -- AFIS, 31 August 2006182 
As illustrated in the news story quoted above, there tends to be a lack of clarity 
and/or understanding regarding the mechanism for requesting and providing military 
support under the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority provision.  While the DoD 
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clearly identifies the IRA provision in various defense directives and other documents as 
a formal and pre-approved exception to the standard DSCA civil-request and approval 
method, the process of requesting IRA assistance is still not included, identified, or 
footnoted in the DoD’s doctrinal request for assistance diagrams (Figure 7).   
Furthermore, the ongoing paradigm that the DoD is not, or can not, be a lead 
federal agency during disaster response (also depicted in Figure 7) potentially leads to a 
lack of acceptance and preparedness for this pre-approved DoD response mechanism.  
The DoD’s IRA provision clearly authorizes and establishes circumstances in which the 
U.S. military could potentially be the first and only federal responders to an incident.  In 
such cases, the responding DoD contingent would essentially be the lead federal agency 
and would only transition to the DoD’s traditional supporting role, if and when, FEMA or 
another primary federal agency were activated and in place.  
The DHS and DoD has recently been urged to work together to revise the NRP to 
better delineate circumstances, objectives, and limitations of when DoD might 
temporarily assume the lead for federal responses to domestic catastrophic incidents.183  
Clarifying and improving the DoD’s IRA provision should be a major part of this 
initiative.  Further discussion regarding this persistent issue and problem is provided in 
the forgoing chapters.   
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Figure 7.   Request for Military Assistance Process (From: Joint Pub 3-26, Homeland 
Security, Chapter 4, 11.) 
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IV. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AUTHORITY 
A. OVERVIEW 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) roles and missions have become 
more complex and have become a growing homeland security mission set for the U.S. 
military.  Though often times misunderstood or given limited priority, a significant 
homeland security role and authority of military commanders’ throughout the U.S. is 
provided under the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority provision.  The DoD’s 
Immediate Response Authority provision provides local military commanders (and 
responsible officials of other DoD components) the authority to rapidly respond and 
provide immediate assistance to civil authorities and first responders in order to save 
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.  However, the 
traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is a resource of last resort for 
domestic first responders may require re-examination if the U.S. military, through its IRA 
provision, is to become a fully effective and capable resource.184 
In response to the criticism stemming from the federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina, the DoD has deemed it reasonable to reexamine and perhaps redefine the DoD’s 
role in response to truly catastrophic events.  “Our performance was better then our plans 
(during Hurricane Katrina), and its time to close that gap” remarked Paul McHale, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security.185  The lessons of 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina must not go unheeded.  We must, as a nation, not only increase our 
capabilities to prevent attacks and disasters, but also improve national preparedness to 
respond to disasters that occur despite our best preventative measures.  Hurricanes and 
other disasters will happen again -- it is only a matter of where and when.  Before the 
U.S. government expands the DoD’s role in domestic disaster response, a critical 
question that must be further examined and determined is whether “we need a larger DoD 
role—or just a smarter one?”186   
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Closing the federal response “gap” will require a thorough review of the DoD’s  
primary mechanism and resource for providing immediate disaster support and 
assistance—the IRA provision.  Reviewing, assessing, and identifying issues (such as 
strategic guidance, oversight, and training) that currently support or hinder the DoD’s 
IRA provision would not only help determine the institutional health and strength of the 
provision, but also help identify current barriers which may be limiting the preparedness 
of military commanders and their installations to act under this federal response 
authority.  Limiting these barriers and improving the IRA provision would certainly help 
the DoD and DHS reduce federal disaster response ambiguities and may eventually lead 
to a more concerted and effective national homeland security strategy.  An accurate 
assessment of the IRA provision’s current state of readiness and level of effectiveness is 
clearly needed and should be the critical first step in determining whether the DoD’s 
provision for providing immediate disaster assistance needs to be expanded or simply 
improved.  In a perfect state of preparedness, the DoD’s IRA provision would not always 
be utilized as a first course of action or the last; but it should always be an effective and 
efficient means for providing immediate military aid and assistance to Americans in 
times of crisis.    
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
The IRA exception to the Stafford Act is addressed in several DoD directives 
governing DSCA operations.  Through this provision, local military commanders (and 
responsible officials of other DoD components) are authorized to take “necessary action” 
to respond to requests from civil authorities.  Commanders may, under the IRA, provide 
immediate resources and assistance to civil authorities without prior approval or prior 
declaration under the Stafford Act when a civil emergency or attack overwhelms the 
capabilities of local authorities.  According to the defense directive, these actions are 
authorized when imminently serious conditions necessitate immediate action “to save 
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”187   
Although the IRA provision is not provided for in any formal legislative statute, it 
is said to have deep historical roots and has been acted upon in response to events as far 
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back as the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and as recent as the 1995 bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and following the 2005 
landfall of Hurricane Katrina.188   
In the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, commanders at nearby Fort 
Still and Tinker Air Force Base utilized the IRA provision to provide immediate military 
response and support to local civil authorities.  The commander at Fort Still provided two 
medical evacuation helicopters, explosive ordnance personnel, and two bomb detection 
dog teams.189  While the commander at Tinker, provided two ambulances and a sixty-six 
person rescue team utilizing their IRA. 
During Hurricane Katrina, military commanders at various levels were 
encouraged to take actions utilizing their immediate response authority.  In the aftermath 
of the storm’s landfall, USNORTHCOM issued an Execute Order to encourage military 
commanders located “anywhere within the Joint Operating Area” to provide immediate 
assistance provided they coordinate their response through USNORTHCOM’s deployed 
task force, JTF-Katrina.190 The Deputy SecDef and the CJCS also “encouraged 
commanders to use their inherent immediate response authority to pre-position assets into 
the disaster area… and provide assistance using their expanded immediate response 
authority.”191  The exact amount of IRA actions taken under these encouragements is 
unclear and was not tracked.  However, what is somewhat obvious in the issuing of these 
written and verbal orders during Hurricane Katrina, is that some (if not many) U.S. 
military commanders were unaware or unsure of their inherent authority under the DoD’s 
IRA provision, and thus slower to provide military aid and assistance during the 
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
 The DoD was least effective in the immediate phases of the Katrina operation 
(before landfall and immediately after landfall).  During these first phases, the DoD 
responded “in accordance with its traditional posture under the NRP” and provided 
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assistance only after receiving DSCA requests from the lead federal agency, FEMA.192  
However, DoD officials eventually began to realize the catastrophic nature of the 
disaster, and began to “shift” from their traditional reactive approach to a more proactive 
mobilization of military assets and personnel.193  “This third phase represented a 
departure from the DoD’s traditional practice (of formally processing DSCA requests) 
and enabled the DoD to respond to requests for assistance in a (more) timelier 
manner.”194   
The slow and delayed response by federal government officials and agencies 
during Hurricane Katrina resulted in much political and public debate.  This debate also 
drew some concern regarding the DoD’s preparedness to mitigate the effects of domestic 
disasters.  Though the DoD’s preparedness and response to Katrina was determined to be 
in concert with its role under the NRP, some contend additional DoD “preparations in 
advance of specific requests for support could have enabled a more rapid (DoD) 
response.”195  The White House also asserted that the DoD’s DSCA approval process of 
converting individual mission assignments into “Requests for Assistance” and reviewing 
requests for “legality and appropriateness” was overly bureaucratic and resulted in 
critical needs not being met.196  Could the DoD’s IRA provision (with its streamlined 
request, approval and response mechanism) have played a bigger part in mitigating the 
pain and suffering inflicted by Katrina?  Is the DoD’s IRA provision prepared and 
capable of playing a bigger role in disaster response?  In the federal government’s official 
report on the lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina, the DoD has been urged to 
expand domestic planning with the DHS to delineate when the U.S. military may lead the 
federal response and to work together with “state officials to improve the integration of 
military response capabilities.”197  The report also urges the DoD to revise its current 
IRA provision “to allow commanders, in appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA even 
                                                 
192 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina, A Nation Still Unprepared, Chapter 26, 11. 
193 Ibid., 26. 
194 Ibid., 11. 
195 Ibid., 7. 
196 Ibid., 19. 
197 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 94. 
 61 
without a request from local authorities.”198  While an expanded IRA authority may 
provide for a more flexible and rapid military response to man-made or natural disasters, 
this initiative will certainly not be without consequence or political debate due to the 
potential for increased use of the military for domestic operations and activities.      
The DoD’s IRA provision must become less ambiguous and better intertwined 
with the mechanisms and processes by which federal/state/and local agencies currently 
plan, train, coordinate, and respond to domestic disasters.  This will require deliberate 
and aggressive steps to clarify the role of the provision while also alleviating many of the 
current barriers to its current effectiveness.  Additionally, the legal, national strategy, and 
policy issues impacting federal and DoD domestic preparedness and response will also 
require reevaluation and/or clarification.  This will not be an easy endeavor; however, a 
more effective and concerted national preparedness system will be well worth the effort.   
C. LEGAL PERSPECTIVE  
While the Immediate Response Authority doctrine has firm historical roots, there 
are no statutes or constitutional provisions which expressly authorize the President, much 
less a military commander, to provide immediate disaster assistance.199  The common 
law principle of necessity, according to Winthrop, is the rationale that is most often cited 
to support IRA..200  The Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. Harmony, described the 
‘necessity’ doctrine as follows:  
We are clearly of the opinion that in all of these cases the danger must be 
immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent of the public service, 
such as will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority 
would be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls for.  
Every case must depend on its own circumstances.  It is the emergency 
that gives the right, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the 
taking can be justified.201   
                                                 
198 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 94. 
199 Winthrop, 5 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid., 5-6. 
 62 
Although this Supreme Court case does not specifically address emergencies 
during disaster relief, it has been considered not unreasonable to extend this application 
to such situations.202   
In addition to providing guidelines that limit the types of response activities that 
can be undertaken by the military, current DoD directives also restrict and limit response 
authority.  First, consistent with concerns of federalism, IRA must be facilitated through a 
formal request (written or verbal) from a non-military federal, state, or local government 
authority.  Secondly, military commanders must seek reimbursement for its services; 
however, their response should not be delayed or denied because of inability or 
unwillingness to reimburse the DoD.  Lastly, immediate disaster response activities do 
not take precedence over a military installation’s primary wartime mission.  This 
provision reflects concerns over draining DoD assets and the congressional recognition 
that the armed forces has the ultimate responsibility to defend the nation and, therefore, 
readiness should not be seriously compromised by non-DoD agencies.203   
Ambiguity within the IRA’s current legal authority may also be limiting 
operational planning and execution during certain domestic incidents.  For example, 
according to NRP, actions under the IRA provision should be consistent with the Posse 
Comitatus Act; however, various sources, including a 2005 Congressional Review 
Service Report, identifies the IRA provision as an exclusion to the Posse Comitatus Act 
thereby allowing active military personnel to engage in law enforcement activities.204  
This apparent contradiction limits clarity regarding a military commander’s freedom of action to 
direct and provide immediate law enforcement support to facilitate or regain civil government 
functions.  
The President’s 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security called for a review 
of the legal authority for DSCA operations.205  The DoD’s IRA provision, being outside 
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the typical DSCA legal framework provided under the Stafford Act, would be a prime 
candidate for review and clarification.   
D. CURRENT POLICY AND GUIDANCE  
Directives and guidance governing the IRA provision can be found in several 
DoD documents.  The primary documents include: 
• Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security 
• DoD Manual 3025.1, Manual for Civil Emergencies 
• DoD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities 
• DoD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
It worth noting that the IRA provision does not appear in the DoD’s core strategy 
document for providing civil support planning and guidance, the Military Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support.  Likewise, the provision is not reflected in 
USNORTHCOM’s primary strategy document for guiding homeland security operations, 
the Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept.   
Within the documents that address the DoD’s IRA provision, significant policy 
and guidance are provided below:     
1. Authorized Actions  
According to the defense directive, commanders may utilize the IRA provision to 
provide the following types of activities/support: 206 
• Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, 
maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and 
safeguarding the public health. 
• Emergency restoration of essential public services (including fire-fighting, 
water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel). 
• Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance from 
public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people 
and restoration of essential services. 
• Recover, identification, registration, and disposal of the dead 
• Monitoring and decontaminating radiological, chemical, and biological 
effects; controlling contaminated areas; and reporting through national 
warning and hazard control systems 
• Roadway movement control and planning                                                  
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• Safeguarding, collecting, and distributing food, essential supplies, and 
materiel on the basis of critical priorities 
• Damage assessment 
• Interim emergency communications 
• Facilitating the reestablishment of civil government functions 
2. Levels of Authority  
The DoD currently stipulates two primary authorities involved in initial IRA 
request and response activities—the non-DoD civil authority requesting the assistance 
and the DoD official using their IRA to respond to the civil request.  According to the 
DoD directive, any “local military commander” or “responsible officials of other DoD 
Component” are authorized to provide IRA assistance.207  While there are typically many 
different levels of commanders assigned to a military installation or agency, the DoD 
directives do not clarify or draw a distinction.  However, some services have clarified the 
level in which IRA authority resides.  For example, the Air Force has placed primary IRA 
planning and response authority with the senior installation commander (typically an O-6 
or Brigadier General).208 
The civil authority authorized to request military assistance under the IRA 
provision, according the DoD directive, may be any “nonmilitary federal, state, or local 
government agency.”209 However, this definition does not clearly specify the level of 
authority within these “agencies” that may request assistance.  To help clarify this 
authority, the JCS doctrine for homeland security operations further defines civil 
authorities as “those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the 
government of the United States… and its possessions and territories.”210  As such, this 
authority clearly applies to a variety of agencies and positions involved in managing 
disaster response including fire, police, emergency management officials, and city 
managers and mayors.   
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3. Planning and Coordinating Mechanisms  
Planning and coordination activities for the IRA provision are not specifically 
discussed within the primary DoD directives governing IRA.  In order to better prepare 
for DSCA missions, the JCS doctrine for homeland security addresses the use of 
memorandums of agreement (MOA) or understanding (MOU) as a form of mutual aid 
agreement between the DoD and civil agencies which may help define the scope of 
support to be provided; “either routinely or in an emergency.”211  The Air Force highly 
encourages installation commanders to work with their local communities and to develop 
MOAs to specifically facilitate IRA planning and response.212 
The Air Force also encourages key installation personnel to become “familiar 
with the layout of the communities that surround the installation, the hazards to Air Force 
personnel, and the type of support that may be required” under IRA.213  This includes 
being “aware of the various industries or facilities in the surrounding communities and 
the potential hazard or threat they pose to the installation.”214  To assist installation in the 
developing their MOAs with local communities, the Air Force currently recommends 
installation commander’s consider and provide the following details in their support 
agreements with local authorities:215 
• Circumstances for requesting IRA assistance 
• Procedures for requesting IRA assistance 
• Procedures for responding to and communicating with lead response 
elements 
• Procedures for cost accounting and potential reimbursement 
• Circumstances and procedures for withdrawing IRA support 
• Procedures for scheduling and conducting IRA training and exercises  
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4. Request Mechanisms 
According to DoD directive, requests for IRA assistance may either be written or 
verbal.  “DoD components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities… may 
initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized” under 
IRA.216 However, verbal requests for IRA assistance “must be followed by a written 
request” as soon as practical.217  Civil authorities are also encouraged to request 
assistance from the nearest DoD component or military commander.  While this is not a 
formal requirement, it certainly has merit since the proximity of resources will directly 
impact response timing.   
5. Response Considerations and Approval 
According to DoD directive, a commander’s primary consideration prior to 
approving IRA requests is whether the military response is required “to help save lives, 
prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”218  The DoD considers 
IRA requests to be “time-sensitive and should be received from local government 
officials within 24 hours following completion of a damage assessment.”219  Once 
imminently serious conditions no longer exist, commanders are encouraged to disengage 
from IRA response activities.220   
There are other considerations worth noting and are illustrated in Figure 8.  Due 
to their primary warfighting missions and obligations, “commanders will always consider 
what the impact of providing immediate response will have on their military mission 
requirements and (will) not jeopardize them.”221  Furthermore, DoD commanders or 
officials acting under the IRA are also required to “report the request through the 
command channels to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) by the most 
expeditious means available.”222 These steps are required not only to advise senior 
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officials of DoD activities, but to seek additional approval or authorization from higher 
headquarters to facilitate further actions.  What is unclear in this requirement, is whether 
local commanders will seek approval prior to initiating immediate response and if so, 
what potential delay this may cause.   
Another deep routed consideration for normal DSCA operations is “that DoD 
resources are provided only when response and recovery requirements are beyond the 
capabilities of civil authorities.”223  It is unclear whether this pertains to the IRA or not 
when the actions are required to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great 
property damage.   
Finally, commanders must consider financial costs and seek cost-reimbursements 
for IRA activities; however the IRA provision dictates immediate responses “should not 
be delayed or denied because of the inability or unwillingness” to reimburse the DoD.224   
 
 
Figure 8.   IRA Considerations (From: AFNSEP Installation Visit Briefing, August 
2006, Briefing template provided by AFNSEP, September 2006) 
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E. CURRENT BARRIERS TO AN EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
AUTHORITY  
In evaluating the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority, several barriers to the 
provision’s overall effectiveness became apparent during the research.  Current barriers 
include: 
1. The U.S. Military’s Support Paradigm  
The U.S. military’s traditional supporting role in responding to domestic 
emergencies and disasters is a paradigm that is deeply entrenched.  Current DoD 
guidance and funding priorities make it clear that “domestic natural disaster response is 
not within the DoD’s primary mission set and will only be undertaken when forces are 
available or if directed by the President or SecDef [Secretary of Defense].”225  As a result 
of this deeply rooted paradigm, the DoD’s IRA provision has received limited attention 
and priority.  While the IRA provision resides in various defense documents, the 
provision remains ambiguous and absent from major national initiatives to improve 
federal disaster preparedness and response.  For example, the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security called on the Department of Homeland Security to consolidate all 
existing federal government emergency response plans into one genuinely all-discipline, 
all-hazard plan that would cover all incidents of national significance; however, the 
resulting National Response Plan contains only a limited reference to the DoD’s 
Immediate Response Authority (Below).  The NRP also does not clearly identify the DoD 
as a potential lead federal agency when acting under the IRA provision. 
Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency may 
require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or 
mitigate property damage.  When such conditions exist and time does not 
permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and 
responsible officials from DoD components and agencies are authorized 
by DoD directives and pre-approval by the Secretary of Defense, subject 
to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DoD 
component, to take necessary action consistent with the Posse Comitatus 
Act (18 U.S.C., 1385) All such necessary action is referred to as 
“Immediate Response.226 
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The DoD’s primary strategy document for civil support also reflects the low 
priority placed on DSCA activities.  According to the Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support, the DoD has established five key objectives to help achieve the strategy’s 
strategic goal of protecting the United States from attack.227  The DoD lists the five key 
objectives in order of priority:228     
1)   Achieve maximum awareness of potential threats 
2)   Deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a safe distance from the United 
States, and US territories and possessions. 
3)   Achieve mission assurance  
4)  Ensure DoD’s ability to support civil authorities in domestic CBRNE 
consequence management  
5)   Improve domestic and international partner capabilities for homeland 
defense and homeland security. 
In considering this prioritized list, it is clear that the DoD does not currently place 
high priority on DSCA activities and considers its core civil support capability to be 
helping to manage the consequences of a domestic CBRNE (chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive) mass casualty attack.  Under the strategy’s 
definition for DSCA it states that DoD support is only provided when directed by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.229  This statement runs counter to the military 
commander’s pre-approved response authority under the IRA.  Furthermore, the National 
Guard is also mentioned in several DoD documents as being the primary lead military 
component for DSCA, illustrating why the IRA provision (which applies primarily to the 
Active component) has remained ambiguous.   
2. Lack of Current and Effective Guidance  
According to the DoD, the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is 
intended to “guide all DoD components across the full range of homeland defense and 
civil support activities.”230  However, the strategy does not once reference the DoD’s 
IRA or its intended purpose and capabilities.  While the NRP does briefly address the 
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IRA provision, it does not stipulate who can request IRA assistance, the actions 
authorized under IRA, or the methods for planning or integrated IRA into local and state 
emergency management response and recovery activities.  Furthermore, compounding 
the limited reference in the National Response Plan, FEMA’s guide to the disaster 
declaration process has no reference to the DoD’s IRA whatsoever!231  This may explain 
why the IRA provision, and the potential resource it represents, has remained in obscurity 
and does not reflect some state emergency plans.  For example, the California Emergency 
Plan, which “defines the emergency management system used for all emergencies in 
California,” does not address local military support under the IRA provision.232   
Some may argue that the benefit of limited guidance is that it provides more 
flexibility to those who may need to act upon it, however, there is a fine line between 
broad and vague guidance.  The DoD’s guidance governing IRA has crossed that fine line 
due to its directives being primarily outdated, un-standardized, and overly vague.  In fact, 
less then three total pages are dedicated to providing IRA guidance within the DoD’s four 
primary documents which reference the provision.  Furthermore, since being written in 
the 1990s, multiple changes, including the establishment of ASD-HD and 
USNORTHCOM, have taken place while the directive and guidance for IRA has 
remained in obscurity.  
3. Lack of Central Oversight   
The DoD’s IRA provision is in desperate need of a Champion 
Although IRA is a DoD-level provision, primary oversight for the majority of the 
provision’s guidance, preparedness, and planning falls on the individual armed services 
and their commanders.  As such, the “jointness” so heavily advocated by the military to 
ensure successful mission planning and unity of effort is strikingly void in the IRA 
provision and its guidance.  The only joint coordination that may occasionally occur at 
the local and state levels is through the interaction of the service’s Reserve Emergency 
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Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO).  However, EPLOs are primarily managed by the 
individual armed services and the only DoD-mandated coordination activity between 
EPLOs consists of an annual joint EPLO conference or workshop.233  Clearly, DoD-level 
oversight of the IRA provision appears to be lacking.  Several oversight shortfalls within 
USNORTHCOM and DHS were also identified during this research: 
USNORTHCOM – Although the President established USNORTHCOM to plan, 
organize, and execute all military homeland defense and civil support missions in the 
continental United States, Alaska, and the offshore waters within its area of 
responsibility, the command has not taken on oversight of the DoD’s Immediate 
Response Authority.234  During Hurricane Katrina, USNORTHCOM was criticized for 
not having “adequate insight into state capabilities or adequate interface with state 
governors.”235  Could oversight of the IRA provision help improve this insight?  It is 
possible that the liaison between local military commanders and civil authorities in 
developing IRA plans may help USNORTHCOM close this gap someday.   
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY - DHS has limited, if any, 
oversight of IRA activities.  As the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating 
federal assistance prior to, during, and after domestic emergencies and disasters, having 
no situational awareness of IRA preparedness and response capabilities results in a major 
and critical blind-spot for DHS. 
4. DoD Force Structure and Disaster Preparedness  
Due to homeland defense (deter-detect-intercept-defeat) missions being its central 
and paramount priority, DoD has remained reluctant to posture or assign large numbers 
of the Active Component forces to direct civil-support roles or missions.  The DoD has 
always sought only narrow responsibilities and missions for domestic operations and has 
worked hard to keep them thin.  This effort reflects the DoD’s support paradigm and the 
fact that the department neither wants nor prepares extensively for civil-military 
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operations on a continuing basis.236  The small and concentrated missions of the joint 
task forces assigned to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM are the notable exceptions.  
According to the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Security and Defense, “with the 
exception of dedicated command and element (JTF-Civil Support) and the National 
Guard’s WMD Civil Support Teams, DoD will continue to rely on dual-capable forces 
for consequence management and other DSCA activities (including IRA).”  These dual-
capable forces, as the strategy calls them, are essentially the 2.5 million service members 
assigned to bases throughout the U.S. and the world.  However, it is unclear how the DoD 
deliberately trains and prepares the majority of these service members for their dual 
missions including DSCA and IRA.  Furthermore, since IRA operations do not take 
precedence over their primary warfighting missions, a commander’s commitment of 
military personnel and resources for IRA activities will be somewhat constrained by 
current DoD priorities, guidelines, and provisions.   
Clearly, the DoD is not funded, organized, trained, or prepared to effectively 
respond to numerous or every domestic disaster.  However, improving IRA planning and 
preparedness through domestic DoD installations and agencies represent a unique and 
valuable emergency response resource.  This resource (totaling over 2,900 different sites 
in all 50 states and U.S. territories237) may just be the critical enabler required during the 
next major U.S. disaster.    
5. Ambiguity Regarding Response Authority  
Although military commanders (and responsible officials of other DoD Agencies) 
currently possess inherent/pre-approved authority under the IRA provision to conduct 
military operations to save lives, to prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 
damage, the full and unrestricted local authority to respond to disasters appears to be 
somewhat ambiguous.  For example, the joint publication for homeland security 
stipulates that when actions are taken under the immediate response authority, 
“commanders must report and gain approval from the SecDef… at the earliest possible 
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opportunity.”238  Likewise, the DoD directive currently states:  “Any commander or 
official acting under the Immediate Response Authority of this Directive shall advise the 
DoD Executive Agent through command channels, by the most expeditious means 
available, and shall seek approval or additional authorizations, as need.”239  The 
requirement for commanders to “gain” or “seek” approval tends to contradict the IRA 
provision’s construct of responding without prior approval to ensure rapid actions are 
taken.  This perceived contradiction may possibly create confusion or delays at the local 
level which could impact the timeliness of local IRA responses.   
6. Lack of Clearly Established Areas of Responsibility (AOR)  
One of the flexible features of the current IRA provision is also probably one of 
its greatest shortfalls.  DoD directives do not currently clarify the areas of responsibility 
in which commander’s should be prepared to respond to under their IRA.  By not 
defining the “local community” AOR, military commanders at various levels and 
locations can respond to civil requests using their Immediate Response Authority.  
Unfortunately, this flexibility tends to contradict with traditional military operational 
planning where clearly delineated areas of responsibilities tend to go hand-in-hand with 
clear lines of authority (or chain of command).  In order to help clarify areas of 
responsibilities, the Air Force has advised homeland installations to develop a 
Memorandum of Understanding or Agreement with the local community to address the 
possibility of an incident and to clarify roles/responsibilities.240  However, neither the Air 
Force, nor the current DoD directives, stipulates or clarifies what the “local community” 
actually entails.  Therefore, military commanders will likely only coordinate and develop 
support agreements with civil authorities within their general proximity.  Consequently, 
there are potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of communities within the United States 
that are not covered under any agreement with a DoD installation/commander due to 
varying distances from DoD installations or facilities.  Results from a survey conducted 
in 2006 of city mayors from 38 different U.S. states reflected this problem.  According to 
the survey, 28% of the 183 cities polled did not have an established support plan with a 
                                                 
238 “Homeland Security,” Joint Publication 3-26, Chapter IV, 12. 
239 “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” DoD Directive 3025.1, Para. 4.5.3, 8.  
240 “Homeland Operations,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-10, 31. 
 74 
nearby military installation.241  This problem is most likely due to two related issues;    1) 
installation commanders are limiting MOUs to only those communities within their 
immediate vicinity and 2) civil authorities are not seeking out military support 
agreements due to their proximity and/or lack of knowledge/understanding of the IRA 
provision.   
One of the first questions a military commander needs clarified is: “What am I 
responsible for?”  Not knowing the answer to that question leaves many more questions 
unasked and unanswered.  These AOR gaps will result in incomplete and ineffective IRA 
coverage, planning, preparedness, and response.   
7. Lack of Consistent and Effective Planning  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security identified planning for military 
support to civil authorities as one of the twelve major initiatives in the area of national 
emergency preparedness and response.242  However, planning for IRA activities has 
received limited DoD oversight and attention since the publication of the governing 
directives in the 1990s.  Although assigned the responsibility to update “plans to provide 
military support to domestic civil authorities in response to natural and man-made 
disasters,” USNORTHCOM does not currently oversee IRA preparedness and response 
planning.243  USNORTHCOM considers IRA planning to be a “local commander 
responsibility” and therefore, has not provided additional guidance or directives to 
facilitate, update, or improve planning for IRA activities within its AOR.244   
While individual military services have continued to provide broad guidance to 
facilitate IRA planning, these efforts have been mostly limited due to resources and 
mission priorities (as discussed previously).  Furthermore, mirroring the ad hoc nature of 
most DSCA operations, deliberate planning for IRA operations is limited.  The Air Force  
currently advises regular and Reserve installation commanders to develop local support                                                   
241 Homeland Security Monitoring Center, Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post Katrina: The State of 
America’s Readiness, 2006 Survey on Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, (United States 
Conference of Mayors, Homeland Security Monitoring Center, 26 July 2006), available at 
www.usmayors.org, accessed 9 October 2006. 
242 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, X. 
243 Ibid., 45. 
244 Donald Miles, USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, Future Operations Division, Interview by Eric 
Leshinsky, Telephone, 16 August 2006.   
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agreements (MOU/A) and plan for situations that would require assigned units to assist 
local authorities to include:245 
• Be aware of various industries and other facilities in the surrounding 
communities 
• Assess what potential hazards or threat these industries/facilities pose 
• Determine what type of assistance each may require in the event of an 
emergency 
• Utilize operational risk management process 
• Be aware of the installation’s critical dependencies on the surrounding 
community  
Despite providing this general guidance and oversight, the Air Force has recently 
noted problems and discrepancies regarding civil support planning.  During an audit 
conducted at 15 Air Force installations in 2005, the Air Force Audit Agency found 
installations were “not fully prepared to provide emergency support to civil 
authorities.”246  The audit identified several base plans lacking “detailed planning factors 
to support critical DSCA planning elements.”247  Furthermore, six of 14 support plans 
reviewed were outdated (over 12 months old), 5 of 14 installations had not conducted a 
DSCA-specific exercise in the past 1-2 years, and 7 of 14 installation exercise plans did 
not contain DSCA exercises at all.248   
Clearly the lack of IRA strategic planning guidance and oversight for IRA 
activities will continue to limit military preparedness and priority for these missions.  
Strategic guidance and oversight provides the foundation to conduct deliberate planning. 
Without it, effective IRA planning initiatives will be the exception and not the norm.   
8. Lack of Effective Training and Exercises  
According to the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the 
military’s Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces will be “trained and equipped 
primarily for warfighting missions in the forward (overseas) regions and (land and sea) 
                                                 
245 “Homeland Operations,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-10, 25. 
246 Air Force Audit Agency, Air Force Support to Civil Authorities, Project F2005-FD3000-0033.000, 
(San Antonio TX, Air Force Audit Agency, Department of the Air Force), 2.  Audit report provided by the 
Air Force Civil Support Division (Washington D.C., AF/A3SHC), 20 October 2006.  
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248 Ibid., 3. 
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approaches to the continental United States.”249  Due to this warfighting focus and 
priority, training initiatives for DSCA activities are greatly limited in scope.  Current 
DoD directives governing the provision do not provide particular guidance for IRA 
training or exercises.  Many EPLOs, specifically within the Air Force250, currently 
provide installation commanders with an overview of the IRA authority and their 
responsibilities during yearly installation visits; however, it is unknown how these visits 
and briefings impact or improves overall IRA preparedness.  
To facilitate IRA preparedness, the Air Force currently mandates that installation 
disaster response personnel and commanders should receive training on the national and 
military response program.  “Installation responders must understand the circumstances 
under which military units provide support to civil authorities, when support should be 
withdrawn, the reporting requirements to higher headquarters, and the validation 
procedures for requests from federal coordination officers and state officials.”251  
However, these training requirements are not standardized in any particular format across 
the Air Force or the DoD; and therefore, training programs will exist at various levels of 
preparedness and effectiveness.  The Air Force also recommends establishing procedures 
for conducting joint IRA exercises in order to familiarize all parties with emergency 
command structures and potential scenarios.252  However, there are varying degrees of 
oversight and priority for these civil-support activities as well.  During the 2005 audit on 
Air Force support to civil authorities, auditors found 12 out of 14 installations had either 
not conducted DSCA-specific exercises in 1-2 years or established plans for DSCA 
exercises, or both.253  It is worth also noting that current IRA training and exercise 
initiatives will also be limited due to the undefined “local community” in which to 
coordinate, train, and exercise.  
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9. Ambiguity Regarding Requests for IRA Assistance   
The civil authority authorized to request military assistance under the IRA 
provision appears to be overly vague.  According DoD directive, any “nonmilitary 
federal, state, or local government agency” may request IRA assistance254  However, this 
definition does not clearly specify a level of authority within these “agencies” authorized 
to request IRA assistance.  For example, can an Assistant City Manager request military 
assistance under the IRA?  To help clarify this authority, the JCS doctrine for homeland 
security operations further defines civil authorities as “those elected and appointed 
officers and employees who constitute the government of the United States… and its 
possessions and territories.”255  As such, this authority apparently applies to a large 
variety of agencies and positions involved in domestic disaster response including fire, 
police, emergency management officials, and city managers and mayors.   
This broad authority to request IRA assistance appears to be in direct conflict with 
the NRP.  The NRP only sites the ability of a state governor to request federal/military 
assistance, even though it addresses both Stafford and non-Stafford Act requests for 
federal disaster support. 
10. Local & State Politics and Emergency Preparedness May Limit IRA 
Effectiveness  
Politics should not stand in the way of mitigating the affects of disasters and other 
domestic emergencies; however, sometimes it does.  Most state governors feel that they 
are ultimately responsible and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters.256  As such, state governors have 
traditionally considered their position to be the primary mechanism for overseeing 
disaster response and for determining when (or if) federal assistance is requested.  
Unfortunately, often times it is not until after disaster strikes that the local and/or state 
authorities’ true preparedness and abilities are reviled.   
Some provisions, such as the Insurrection Act, provide the President the authority 
to impose federal support (to include the armed forces) under certain domestic situations 
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with or without local or state government consent.  The White House’s Hurricane Katrina 
after-actions report recommends the DoD revise its IRA policy to “allow commanders, in 
appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA even without a request from local 
authorities.”257  Clearly, there may come a time when military commanders should be 
provided the authority to respond to certain domestic emergencies without the 
requirement of a formal civil request; however, to impose this initiative prematurely, 
without addressing the current strategic and operational shortfalls of the current IRA 
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V. IMPROVING THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AUTHORITY 
The Immediate Response Authority should not always be utilized as the first 
course of action or the last; but it should always be an effective and efficient means for 
providing immediate military aid and assistance to Americans in times of crisis.   
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATE 
RESPONSE AUTHORITY  
Improving the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority will require a concerted 
effort at the local, state, and federal levels of government and, of course, within the U.S. 
military itself.  Improving the provision and shifting the DoD’s paradigm of support will 
also require various levels of cultural, organizational, and procedural change.  These 
changes will likely become challenging to implement and manage.  Some changes will be 
more difficult then others.  Some will be more politically charged then others.  Some may 
even alter the way many currently view the military’s role in domestic activities to be.  
However, our nation and its citizens deserve the concerted national effort called for in the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security to help minimize the damage and synergize the 
recovery efforts during future disasters.  Improving the DoD’s Immediate Response 
Authority will be a large step in that direction.  Initial recommendations include: 
1. Institutionalize the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority  
A critical step to improve the DoD’s IRA is partly one of mindset, as 
encapsulated in a Center for Strategic and International Studies report which stressed the 
need for the DoD to “accept civil support as a central mission and to act accordingly.” 258  
Although the U.S. military’s IRA is a current mechanism for initiating immediate actions 
to mitigate the affects of domestic disasters, the provision and its potential capabilities 
has commanded limited attention within the national preparedness arena.  Several critical 
steps must be taken within various agencies to help better institutionalize the DoD’s 
Immediate Response Authority.  They include:  
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U.S. Government:  Identified as a major initiative highlighted in the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, a thorough review of the laws permitting the military to 
act within the United States should be conducted.259  This initiative, when initiated, 
should also include a thorough review of the DoD’s Immediate Response Authority.  By 
doing so, critical initial steps can be taken to institutionalize the military’s IRA by 
providing the provision a formal legal foundation and framework similar to that provided 
for most DSCA activities under the Stafford Act.  This foundation will hopefully provide 
clarity to the legal authority for IRA missions and protect DoD personnel (from civil 
actions and liabilities) when responding under the IRA.   
Department of Defense:  The DoD must continue to shift its support paradigm to a 
more proactive approach for missions involving DSCA.  The current IRA provision 
clearly provides the authority for DoD installations and agencies to immediately respond 
to domestic emergencies, which would likely entail temporarily assuming the role and 
responsibility as a lead federal agency at a domestic incident.  As such, the DoD must 
take the lead to institutionalize the IRA provision.  To begin with, the DoD must improve 
IRA guidance.  The DoD should take the initiative to improve the directives governing 
the IRA to help ensure the same standards of clarity, coordination, and planning as is 
currently undertaken for traditional military operations.  At the very least, the DoD 
should centralize IRA guidance into a single directive and clarify roles, rules of 
engagement, and oversight responsibilities across the entire DoD.  The IRA must be 
integrated within the pillars of civil support to become visible and more effective (Figure 
9).   
As the DoD agency responsible for military operations (to include civil support 
missions) within the Continental United States, USNORTHCOM should assume the lead 
role in overseeing IRA activities within its AOR.  This responsibility should include 
oversight of IRA exercises and inspections.  USNORTHCOM and USPACOM must be 
involved in developing and delivering ongoing training modules, exercise scenarios, and 
planning guidance to DoD and non-DoD agencies within their AORs.  The DoD and 
COCOMs should also lead the development of state/regional AORs for IRA activities 
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and planning.  Within this effort, DoD should mandate the development of MOU/As 
strictly for IRA activities and require coordination between DoD installations and 
agencies within specific AORs.   
Department of Homeland Security:  The Department of Homeland Security must 
also accomplish several tasks to help institutionalize the DoD’s IRA.  First, DHS must 
revise the National Response Plan to help clarify the IRA.  The NRP should provide a 
general, yet detailed, outline of the DoD’s IRA.  The overviews of federal involvement 
under Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act situations in Appendix 5 and 6 of the NRP 
should be amended to include the IRA provision.  The process figures (on pages 93 and 
95) should also include process option blocks for the IRA as depicted in Figure 10. 
 








Figure 9.   Pillars of Civil Support (From: DSCINT Handbook No.104, Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
15 August 2005, Section II, 5) 
 
The NRP should also clarify that various local and state authorities, and not just 





DoD installations and agencies under the IRA.  The DHS should also consider adding 
IRA as an implementation mechanism for initiating proactive federal responses during 
catastrophic events in the NRP.260   
The DHS should also work with the DoD to establish procedures to oversee and 
monitor IRA activities including preparedness and response.  This initiative would help 
ensure the DHS Secretary’s compliance with HSPD-5 which mandates the Secretary  
coordinate federal resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, or other emergencies when federal resources have been requested.261 
Likewise, FEMA should also become familiar with the IRA provision and update 
applicable guidance to reflect IRA to help raise awareness in the emergency preparedness 




Figure 10.   Overviews of Disaster Involvement (From: National Response Plan, 93/95) 
 
Lastly, DHS should consider revising its homeland security grant program.  DHS’ 
grant criteria should mandate that local/state authorities and agencies incorporate IRA 
participation/coordination in their emergency response planning and exercises in order to  
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be eligible for DHS grants.  DoD participation/coordination (utilizing an MOU/MOA or 
other mutual aid agreement) should become a prerequisite for federal homeland security 
grant submission and approval. 
2. Improve IRA Guidance   
Several issues regarding guidance outlining federal and military assistance should 
be amended or clarified to improve the IRA provision and reduce the ambiguities 
experienced during Hurricane Katrina.  First and foremost, as the primary strategy 
document intended to guide civil support activities, the DoD’s Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support, should be amended to include detailed information and 
guidance regarding the IRA provision.  Along with the strategy’s current assumption that 
during “major catastrophes, the President will direct DoD to provide… civil support,” an 
additional assumption should be added to clarify that local commander’s may direct, 
when circumstances dictate, military assistance under their inherent immediate response 
authority.  
Furthermore, the DoD should work with DHS to provide thorough guidelines and 
information regarding IRA in the NRP.  Lastly the DoD should consider consolidating 
IRA guidance into a single DoD directive and/or handbook strictly dedicated to the 
provision.  This endeavor should include clarifying critical information and questions 
regarding IRA to include:   
• Under what criteria and precedence may IRA activities be authorized?  
• Must the local/state first responders be overwhelmed?   
• Does it matter how many lives or property is involved? 
• When may commanders respond without receipt of a civil request? 
• When should IRA activities be terminated? 
• Who can request IRA assistance?   
• Local, state, federal agencies/positions/case-by-case  
• Who can approve IRA assistance? 
• Base/installation/agency commanders/minimum grade requirement  
(Military and Civilian)  
• What is the “local community” for each DoD installation/agency?   
• DoD should establish clear guidance on AORs 
 84 
• DoD should establish procedures for U.S. military 
installations/agencies within AORs to coordinate IRA planning 
and response activities  
3. Improve IRA Planning   
As highlighted in the U.S. Senate Committee report on Hurricane Katrina, the 
ability to effectively respond to mass disasters and other emergencies is a “critical role of 
every level of government.  It is a role that requires an unusual level of planning, 
coordination, and dispatch among governments’ diverse units.”262  Improving the DoD’s 
IRA will also require a concerted effort in the area of planning and preparation.  Effective 
preparedness for IRA activities will only be achieved through collaborative and active 
planning processes involving local, state, and federal authorities and numerous 
government and non-government agencies.  Planning initiatives should include: 
a. Community-base planning:  We can’t plan for every scenario, but we should 
start by planning for those events most likely to occur.  As such, planning methodology at 
the local and state levels must involve a complete analysis of current first responder 
capabilities, potential scenarios, and overall community threats and resources.  Local and 
state civil authorities, emergency managers, and military leaders should work together to 
develop various courses of actions necessary to mitigate the affects of potential disasters.  
Mutual aid agreements should be established between civilian and military agencies as 
appropriate to clarify roles, responsibilities, and most importantly expectations.  When 
capability gaps are identified, resources should be sought out or pre-identified at the 
regional or federal levels.  Military commanders should be required to identify and 
posture IRA response teams of various size and capabilities (medical/fire/search and 
recovery/etc.), based on AOR requirements, to help facilitate timely disaster responses.  
b. Interagency coordination:  The DoD and DHS must work together improve the 
federal government’s oversight on IRA planning and preparedness.  Contingency plans 
for specific domestic incident scenarios should be continually coordinated, developed, 
tested, and revised.  Various courses of action to domestic disasters, to include utilizing 
the IRA, should be evaluated based on levels of effectiveness and response timelines.  
For example, although local and state first responders may not be overwhelmed by a                                                  
262 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina:  A Nation Still Unprepared, 2. 
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particular incident, a local DoD installation (based on its capabilities and/or proximity to 
the event) may in fact be the most effective response mechanism available to mitigate the 
incidents affects.  These situations must be considered and evaluated at all levels of 
incident response planning.  The DoD and DHS in collaboration with local and state 
agencies/authorities should also establish an open forum (utilizing the internet and formal 
conferences) to provide lessons learned and best practices in the area of IRA 
preparedness and planning.   
USNORTHCOM should also consider adopting USPACCOM’s Joint Task Force-
Homeland Defense’s concept of operations.  This concept involves organizing all military 
facilities and infrastructure in Hawaii into “Base Clusters” to facilitate planning, 
prioritization, and coordination with civilian agencies.263    
4. Improve IRA Training and Education   
According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the DoD and the DHS 
will participate as appropriate in homeland security training that involves military and 
civilian emergency response personnel.264  Based on the IRA’s potential capability to 
mitigate the affects of natural and/or man-made disasters, these departments must 
improve and increase the IRA training and education they provide to DoD and non-DoD 
entities.  Recommended initiatives for each department are provided below.   
Department of Defense:  Just as the DoD currently mandates yearly refresher 
training covering the Laws of Armed Conflict, the DoD should develop and mandate all 
DoD personnel receive DSCA (to include IRA) orientation and training.  The DoD 
should also oversee and centralize, as appropriate, the training provided to military on-
scene commanders and first responders. The DoD should also develop a simple to read 
handbook for distribution throughout the DoD and to local/state civil authorities and first 
responders that provides clear insight into the IRA provision, it resources, and the various 
points of contact.    
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Department of Homeland Security:  As proposed in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, the DHS should include the IRA in their efforts to build a national 
training and evaluation system.265  This should include expanding the training and 
assessments for DSCA (including IRA) it provides to local, state, and federal agencies 
and first responders.   
5. Review the DoD’s Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) 
Program   
The DoD should also conduct a thorough review of the EPLO program.  The DoD 
should oversee and evaluate the individual role and effectiveness of current liaison 
positions (which currently total over 300 senior officers and staff) and should consider 
realigning any identified redundancies.  Along with standardizing EPLO training and 
guidance, the DoD should consider consolidating EPLO service positions into joint 
billets.  While this effort may decrease the overall number of EPLO officers assigned to 
FEMA and other agencies, the consolidated oversight and expertise may eventually 
improve IRA and DSCA preparedness and response.  Additionally, the manpower 
savings could enable more EPLO billets/positions be established at USNORTHCOM and 
USPACOM to improve operational DSCA and IRA planning, guidance, and oversight.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND 
STUDY  
The recommendations below were developed during the course of this research 
and should be considered and/or evaluated through further study. 
• DoD and DHS should evaluate, clarify, and simplify the financial 
reimbursement policies related to DSCA (including IRA).  Civil 
authorities and DoD officials must better understand the circumstances 
where DSCA and IRA actions will require reimbursement and when 
reimbursements will not be sought due Presidential disaster 
declaration/military training benefit/etc.  
• The DoD should closely monitor each military services’ transformation 
efforts and evaluate potential impact on homeland security, including 
DSCA and IRA missions. 
• Future Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) criteria should include the 
potential impact a base closure may have on IRA operations/effectiveness. 
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• The DoD should continue to evaluate/assign/establish specific military 
units for homeland security roles/missions (such as JTF-Civil Support), as 
needed. 
• The DoD should continue to examine and clarify the various homeland 
security roles/missions that will be carried out by the Active, Reserve, and 



















VI. CONCLUSION  
The ongoing debate over the federal government’s roles and missions in 
providing homeland security is important and must continue in order to improve the unity 
of effort from those entities entrusted to provide national security.  However, we must 
never forget that disasters (both natural and man-made) can strike at any time, as it did on 
an idle, crystal-clear, Tuesday morning in New York City on September 11, 2001.  We 
must work aggressively to ensure every local, state, and federal first responder (to include 
DoD personnel acting under the Immediate Response Authority) are prepared and ready 
to respond in unity and total-force.   
Although the DoD is normally considered a resource of last resort to aid in civil 
crisis and disaster relief efforts, its immense operational capabilities often results in the 
U.S. military being the primary course of action.  Many in the U.S. government agree that 
a closer evaluation of existing procedures for the DoD under the National Response Plan, 
paying particular attention to the DoD’s role when first responders are wiped out or 
otherwise incapable of providing initial response, is necessary.266  Events such as 9/11 
and Hurricane Katrina have resulted in increased political and public pressure to widen 
the military’s role in homeland security missions.  The Bush administration has 
introduced the prospect of expanding the military’s role in internal missions including 
civil-support operations.  A point illustrated during a post-Hurricane Katrina interview 
where President Bush contented that such events in the future may “require greater 
federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces.”267   
Creating a comprehensive national approach to respond effectively to domestic 
emergencies will require a cooperative and on-going effort between local, state, and 
federal agencies to maximize resources and capabilities through expanded deliberate and 
community-based planning for DSCA activities.  Considerations on expanding and 
improving the military’s role in civil-support missions (to include IRA) will also certainly 
require a review into the military’s current funding, preparedness and training for these 
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missions.  While the DoD has a robust response mechanism and various resources to 
mitigate disasters of limited-scope, it is simply not always adequately organized and/or 
prepared to respond to catastrophic disasters and domestic emergencies.  However, until 
greater civilian capabilities are developed, the DoD will continue to be relied upon to 
provide massive assistance in instances of catastrophic disasters.268  
Improving the IRA provision will take many difficult steps.  Making the provision 
fully effective will be even more difficult.  The U.S. military and its government may 
need to shift current domestic disaster preparedness and response paradigms.  For 
example, the U.S. government’s current primary strategic objectives for homeland 
security (in order of priority) are to:269 
1)   Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States 
2)   Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism 
3)   Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur 
Why is the list prioritized in this way?  Is not reducing America’s vulnerabilities 
and improving the federal response mechanisms to disasters just as important, and just as 
critical, as preventing attacks?  The lessons of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina are that we as 
a nation, must not only increase our capabilities to prevent attacks and disasters, but also 
improve national preparedness to respond to disasters that occur despite our best 
preventative measures.  Hurricanes and other disasters will happen again - it is just a 
matter of where and when.  Putting increased attention and pressure to improve the 
DoD’s Immediate Response Authority provision will certainly help efforts toward a more 
concerted and effective national homeland security strategy and approach.   
In a perfect state of preparedness, the DoD’s IRA provision would not always be 
utilized as the first course of action or the last; but it should always be an effective and 
efficient means for providing immediate military aid and assistance to Americans in 
times of crisis.     
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This research was intended to evaluate and determine the overall effectiveness of 
the DoD’s current Immediate Response Authority (IRA) provision.  Many problems that 
affect federal and military emergency preparedness are longstanding.  There are also 
impediments to implementing the current IRA provision. A listing (with the applicable 
page number for further information) of these findings is provided below:  
• The federal government has experience difficultly ensuring effective and 
timely federal responses to domestic emergencies and disasters (page 24) 
• The federal government has experience difficulty ensuring effective 
intergovernmental coordination and operability (page 28) 
• There is a lack of clearly established DoD roles and missions for 
homeland security and civil support operations (page 53) 
• There is a lack of clarity regarding the mechanism for requesting military 
support under the DoD’s IRA provision (page 54) 
• The U.S. military’s civil-support paradigm limits IRA effectiveness (page 
68) 
• There is a lack of effective IRA guidance (page 69) 
• There is a lack of central IRA oversight (page 70)  
• DoD’s current force structure and disaster preparedness limits IRA 
effectiveness (page 71) 
• Ambiguity regarding IRA response authority limits IRA effectiveness 
(page 72) 
• Lack of clearly established areas of responsibility (AOR) limits IRA 
effectiveness (page 73) 
• There is a lack of consistent and effective IRA planning (page 74) 
• There is a lack of effective IRA training and exercises (page 75) 
• There is ambiguity regarding requests for IRA assistance (page 77)  
• Local & state politics and emergency preparedness may limit IRA 
effectiveness (page 77) 
 
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
A listing (with the applicable page number for further information) of the 
proposed recommendations identified in the research is provided below: 
 
 92 
1. Recommendations for the U.S. Government 
• The U.S. government should conduct a legal review of DSCA and IRA 
activities (page 80) 
• The U.S. government should consider amending Future Base Realignment 
and Closure (BRAC) criteria to include the potential impact a base closure 
may have on IRA operations/effectiveness  (page 86) 
2. Recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security 
• The DHS should revise the NRP to help clarify the IRA provision (page 
81) 
• The DHS should clarify that local and state authorities (in addition to the 
state governor) may request IRA assistance (page 81) 
• The DHS should consider adding IRA as an implementation mechanism 
for providing proactive federal responses to catastrophic events within the 
NRP (page 82) 
• The DHS should work with DoD to establish procedures to oversee and 
monitor IRA preparedness and response (page 82) 
• The FEMA should become familiar with the IRA provision and update 
applicable guidance to help raise awareness among civil authorities (page 
82) 
• The DHS should consider revising the homeland security grant program to 
mandate and improve IRA planning/cooperation (page 82) 
• The DHS should work with DoD to evaluate, clarify, and simplify 
financial reimbursement policies related to DSCA, including IRA       
(page 86) 
3. Recommendations for the Department of Defense 
• The DoD should update, improve, and clarify IRA guidance (pages 80-84) 
• The DoD should consolidate IRA guidance into a single directive and 
develop an IRA handbook for DoD and civil authorities (page 80 and 84) 
• The DoD should update the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support to include information and guidance regarding the IRA provision 
(page 83) 
• The DoD should work with DHS to establish procedures to oversee and 
monitor IRA preparedness and response (page 82) 
• The DoD should work with DHS to develop an open forum (utilizing the 
internet and formal conferences) to provide lessons learned and best 
practices in the area of IRA preparedness and planning (page 85) 
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• USNORTHCOM should assume the lead role for IRA preparedness and 
guidance within its AOR (page 80) 
• USNORTHCOM should consider adopting and implementing Joint Task 
Force-Homeland Defense’s (USPACOM) concept of operations to 
facilitate ‘cluster’ planning within AORs (page 85) 
• The DoD should clarify IRA training and exercise requirements and 
mandate military commanders posture various teams for IRA activities 
(page 84-85) 
• The DoD should develop and mandate DSCA and IRA training for all 
military personnel (page 85) 
• The DoD should conduct a thorough review of its Emergency 
Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program (page 86) 
• The DoD should work with DHS to evaluate, clarify, and simplify 
financial reimbursement policies related to DSCA, including IRA       
(page 86) 
• The DoD should closely monitor service transformation and evaluate the 
impact on civil support operations (page 86) 
• The DoD should continue to evaluate/assign/establish specific military 
units for domestic operations, as needed (page 87) 
• The DoD should continue to examine and clarify DSCA roles and 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 95 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Air Force Audit Agency.  “Air Force Support to Civil Authorities.”  Air Force Audit 
Agency Report.  Project F2005-FD3000-0033.000.  San Antonio TX.  Air Force 
Audit Agency.  September 2006.  
Bazan, Elizabeth. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act: 
Legal Requirements for Federal and State Roles in Declarations of an Emergency 
or a Major Disaster.” Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service. 
September 2005. 
Bea, Keith. The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress. 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 10 March 2005. 
Bowman, Steve. Homeland Security:  Establishment and Implementation of the United 
States Northern Command. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
18 August 2006. 
Bowman, Steve; Kapp, Lawrence; and Belasco, Amy. Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster 
Response. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 19 September 
2005. 
Brake, Jeffrey. Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: 
Background and Issues for Congress. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service. 27 January 2003. 
Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, Scott.  “Who Guards the Guardians and How.” 
University of Texas Press. 2006. 
Carafano, James. “Critics of the Hurricane Response Miss the Mark in Focusing on Posse 
Comitatus.” Heritage Foundation. Executive Memorandum. Number 983. 3 
October 2005. 
Carafano, James and Richard Weitz.  “Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism 
and the Importance of Grassroots Response.” Heritage Foundation. Executive 
Memorandum. Number 1923. 21 March 2006. 
Department of Defense. Base Structure Report. Fiscal Year 2005 Baseline, Washington 
D.C.: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.  Department of Defense. 
2005.   
————. DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security.  Defense Science Board 2003 
Summer Study Report.  Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, May 2004. 
————. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.  Washington D.C.: 
Department of Defense, June 2005. www.dtic.mil (accessed 23 September 2006). 
 96 
Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security, 25 May 2006.  
————. Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan. Washington D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security. 22 May 2006.  
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=15&content=4269 (accessed 23 
September 2006). 
Elsea, Jenniefer.  The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Some Legal Issues. 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 16 September 2005. 
Gentry, John.  “Complex Civil-Military Operations; A U.S. Military-Centric 
Perspective.” Naval War College Review, Autumn 2000.   
www.nwc.navy.mil/press (accessed on 5 October 2006). 
Government Accountability Office. Disaster Management:  Improving the Nation’s 
Response to Catastrophic Disasters.  Washington D.C.: Government 
Accountability Office, July 1993. 
————. Emergency Preparedness and Response:  Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents.  Government Accountability Office, 
23 February 2006. 
————. Homeland Defense:  DoD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 
Domestic Military Missions. Washington D.C.: Government Accountability 
Office, July 2003. 
————. Hurricane Katrina; GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recover. Washington D.C.: Government 
Accountability Office.  8 March 2006. 
Guttieri, Karen. “Homeland Security and U.S. Civil-Military Relations.” Strategic 
Insights. Department of National Security Affairs. Naval Postgraduate School. 
Monterey CA. 1 August 2003. 
Henrikson, Andrew.  “An Interagency Approach to U.S. Port Security.” Strategic 
Insights. Volume IV, Issue 2. Center for Contemporary Conflict, February 2005. 
Hogue, Henry and Bea, Keith. Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
Organization:  Historical Developments and Legislative Options. Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 1 August 2006. 
 “Homeland Operations.”  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-10, 21 March 2006. 
“Homeland Security.”  Joint Publication 3-26, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 August 2005. 
 97 
Krause, Merrick and Jeffrey Smotherman.  “An Interview with Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense.” Joint Forces Quarterly. Issue 40, 1st Qtr 2006.  
ndupress.ndu.edu (accessed 12 August 2006). 
Lawlor, Bruce.  “Military Support of Civil Authorities – A New Focus for a New 
Millennium.”  Journal of Homeland Security, 2 March 2004.   
www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/articles/lawlor.htm (accessed 5 October 
2006). 
Lujan, Thomas. “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army.” Parameters. 
Vol. 27. No. 3 (Autumn 1997). 
“Manual for Civil Emergencies.” Department of Defense Manual 3025.1-M, June 1994. 
Mendenhall, Michael.  “The Constitution of the United States of America:  The 
Definitive Edition.”  The Institute for Constitutional Research. Monterey CA. 
1990. 
“Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.” Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, 18 
February 1997. 
“Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).” Department of Defense 
Directive 3025.12, 4 February 1994. 
“Military Emergency Preparedness Officer (EPLO) Program.” Department of Defense 
Directive 3025.16, 18 December 2000. 
 “Military Support to Civil Authorities.” Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, 15 
January 1993. 
Mitchell, Jeff. “2006 State Homeland Security Directors Survey.” NGA Center for Best 
Practices. www.nga.org/center (accessed 12 August 2006). 
National Journal’s Congress Daily AM. “Governors Oppose Expanding Military's Role 
In Disasters.” National Journal's CongressDailyAM. October 20, 2005.  
http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20051020397469.html (accessed on 13 August 
2006). 
Reese, Shawn.  State and Urban Area Homeland Security Plans and Exercises:  Issues 
for the 109th Congress. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 3 
March 2006. 
Schmitt, Eric.  “Wider Military Role in U.S. is Urged.”  The New York Times. 21 July 
2002. 
 98 
Sharon, Mike.  “Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers: Your Key to Military 
Support.” International Association of Emergency Managers. Volume. 22, No. 7, 
July 2005. 
The White House. National Strategy for Homeland Security. Washington D.C.: Office of 
Homeland Security. The White House.  July 2002. 
————. President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts. White House News 
Release. Washington D.C.: Office of the Press Secretary. The White House. 31 
August 2005. 
————. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington 
D.C.: The White House.  February 2006.   
————. 9/11 Five Years Later:  Successes and Challenges. Washington D.C.: The 
White House.  September 2006. www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/waronterror/2006 
(accessed 22 October 2006). 
Towell, Pat.  “Northern Command Stirs Issue of Military’s Role in Security,” 
Congressional Quarterly – Weekly, 2 November 2002.  
http://library2.cqpress.com/cqweekly (accessed 3 January 2003). 
U.S. Conference of Mayors.  “Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post Katrina: The State of 
America’s Readiness.” A 186-City Survey, U.S. Conference of Mayors, 26 July 
2006. 
U.S. House of Representatives. A Failure of Initiative. Final Report of the Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina. Washington D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives. 15 February 
2006.  
U.S. Senate.  Hurricane Katrina:  A Nation Still Unprepared. Report of the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Congress, May 
2006. 
Washington Post. “Military May Do More Domestic Disaster Work.” 19 September 
2005. 
Winthrop, Jim.  “The Oklahoma City Bombing:  Immediate Response Authority and 
other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MSCA),” The Army Lawyer, July 
1997.  
Wormuth, Christine.  “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, The Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report.” The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. July 2006. 
 99 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Institute for National Security Studies 
United States Air Force 
United States Air Force Academy, Colorado 
 
4. Monterey Institute of International Studies  
Monterey, California 
 
5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense 
 U.S. Department of Defense 
Washington, D.C. 
 
6. Air Force Civil Support Division (AF/A3SHC) 
 United States Air Force 
 Washington, D.C. 
